This work is criticised by Bp: Hurd. vol: 8 pp 307 et seq

A

DISSERTATION

ON THE

PRINCIPLES

OF

HUMAN ELOQUENCE:

WITH

Particular Regard to the STYLE and COMPOSITION

OF THE

NEW TESTAMENT.

IN WHICH

The Obſervations on this SUBJECT by the LORD BISHOP of GLOUCESTER, in his Diſcourſe on the DOCTRINE OF GRACE, are diſtinctly conſidered.

BEING

The Subſtance of ſeveral LECTURES read in the ORATORY-SCHOOL of TRINITY-COLLEGE, DUBLIN.

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LONDON:

Printed for W. JOHNSTON, in *Ludgate-Street*.

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ADVERTISEMENT.

THE Reader will eaſily perceive from ſeveral illuſtrations, and other particulars in the following ſheets, that they were intended originally for YOUNG Hearers; to whom, (as is intimated in the Title Page) they were at firſt addreſſed in another form merely to fulfill the duties of an *Academical Office*, and without intention of farther publication.

If they are now ſubmitted to the cenſure of the world, it is not from any ambition of appearing in a Conteſt with a Writer of diſtinguiſhed Eminence; but principally from a deference to their Opinions, who thought that the liberties taken with ſuch a Character, and the examination of his Opinions ſhould be ſtrictly *public*: and that to confine them to a ſmall obſcure Circle, might appear equally diſingenuous, with ſecret and clandeſtine Cenſure, in Common Life.

BSE126

INTRODUCTION.

ELOQUENCE, STYLE, COMPOSITION, and ſuch like, have already been ſo frequently and ſo fully treated by various writers, that it ſeems ſcarcely juſtifiable to reſume them, but on ſome occaſion, or for ſome purpoſe of conſequence. Nor can I plead any apology for the critical diſcuſſions in the following ſheets, but that they are connected with a ſubject of real moment: I mean an objection which the enemies of our holy religion have made to the Apoſtolical writings, which indeed hath oftentimes received anſwers

ſufficiently ſatisfactory, but, like others, hath as often been repeated.

The objection is thus ſtated by a learned perſon, who is ſaid to *lend the libertine theſe arms.*——— "We ſhould naturally expect to find an inſpired "language to be ſuch as is worthy of God, that is, "pure, clear, noble, and affecting, even beyond "the force of common ſpeech, ſince nothing can "come from God, but what is perfect in it's "kind: In ſhort, the purity of Plato, and the "eloquence of Cicero. Now, if we try the "Apoſtolic language by this rule, we ſhall be ſo "far from aſcribing it to God, that we ſhall "ſcarce think it worthy of man, that is, of the "liberal and polite, it being utterly rude and "barbarous, and abounding with every fault "that can poſſibly deform a language." [Dr. MIDDLETON.

The Lord Biſhop of GLOUCESTER, in his late treatiſe on the DOCTRINE of GRACE, hath conſidered this objection at large; and, in his reply, ſeems to have diſplayed that bold oppoſition to the general opinions of mankind, by which his learned

learned labours are diſtinguiſhed. The ſubſtance of his anſwer is here collected with all the care and caution in my power.

His Lordſhip obſerves, that the objection is founded on two propoſitions, neither of them true *. One is, that

" An Inſpired Language muſt be a language " of perfect Eloquence."

* Doctrine of Grace, B. 1. C. 8. p. 41.

The other, that

" Eloquence is ſomething congenial and eſſen- " tial to human ſpeech."

To the firſt he anſwers, by what he juſtly calls it bold to affirm †, That " the rudeneſs and bar- " barouſneſs of the Apoſtolical Style, even tho' " as great as the moſt exaggerated Accounts " would perſuade us to believe, is ſo far from " proving ſuch language not divinely inſpired, " that it is one *certain mark* of this original."

† Ibid.

To the ſecond he replies, by affirming that " § Eloquence is no eſſential part or quality, but " merely an accidental abuſe of human ſpeech.

§ C. 9. p. 52.

‖ Ibid. “ ‖ That it is a mode of communication which
“ changes with the changing climates of the earth.
“ That it's conſtituent parts are arbitrary, caſual,
“ and capricious. That, among all the different
“ kinds or ſpecies of compoſition which have
* C. 8. p. 51. “ been adopted by different people, * any one
“ may, by being thus adopted and imitated, be-
“ come as real and ſubſtantial a pattern of Elo-
† P. 56. “ quence as any other whatſoever. † That if the
“ Apoſtolical writers had adhered to any one of
“ theſe various patterns, it might ſtill have been
“ objected that they had not choſen ſome one of
“ many others, all equal in their intrinſic value.
“ That none of them, however, could have been
‡ P. 56, 57. “ adopted, becauſe ‡ Eloquence, even when it
“ extends only to the more general principles com-
“ mon to all languages, *is* nothing more than a
“ perſuaſive turn given to the elocution to ſupply
“ that inward, that conſcious perſuaſion ſo ne-
“ ceſſary to gain a fair hearing: and that the *end*
“ of eloquence, is to ſtifle reaſon, and inflame
“ the paſſions.”

There is no diſtiction more frequently obſerved by thoſe who write or ſpeak of compoſition, than

that

that between real, genuine Eloquence, and the affected ornament and artifice of Rhetoricians. And, at firſt view, it was natural to ſuppoſe, that the cenſure of the learned Prelate was confined to theſe latter, and that by the term *Eloquence*, he underſtood no more than theſe. But as the objection to the Apoſtolic writings is founded on the ſuppoſition that there is ſomething of *real* and *intrinſic* excellence, ſomething *naturally* forcible, conciliating, and affecting, in certain modes of elocution; his Lordſhip's attack muſt have been directly pointed againſt this ſuppoſition. And as the objectors affect to require real and genuine eloquence in the inſpired writers, it would be preſumption to ſuppoſe that their able and judicious antagoniſt thought he had effectually ſilenced their raſh cenſures, by proving that *Rhetorical artifice* (a thing totally different from the former, and by no means acknowledged as an excellence) was inconſiſtent with the genius of the Goſpel.

Beſides, his Lordſhip ſeems to have ſufficiently explained his own meaning, by extending his cenſure to every thing in ſpeech, which exceeds the ſtrict bounds * of *clearneſs* and *preciſion*; every thing which deviates from Metaphyſical or Logical accuracy.

* P. 57, 58.

I pre-

I preſume, therefore, that I have fairly and regularly proceeded in the following examination of his Lordſhip's Sentiments, firſt, by conſidering Eloquence in it's general acceptation, as including all thoſe forms of ſpeech uſually called *tropical* or *figurative*, thoſe modes of addreſs which are principally intended to *influence* and *perſuade*, by exciting paſſion or emotion; and by enquiring whether theſe be not congenial to language; whether they be meerly the abuſes, or neceſſary and eſſential parts of human ſpeech; and whether their natural power and tendency be to deceive and betray.

Secondly, by proceeding to a more artificial view of Eloquence, as a compound of ſeveral qualities, according to the diviſion of the learned Prelate, and of other eminent Critics. And here we are to enquire whether theſe ſeveral qualities in their nature and principles, be really vague, arbitrary, fantaſtical, and capricious.

Hence we ſhall be led (in the laſt place) to the conſideration of that more important queſtion, "Whether an inſpired Language muſt be a lan-"guage of perfect Eloquence."----And when the ſacred writings are defended upon principles acknowledged

knowledged to be paradoxical, ſhould theſe principles appear the leaſt defective in point of evidence; ſhould they only prove obviouſly liable to be miſconceived or miſapplied; it may be no uſeleſs attempt to ſhew that they are not *neceſſary*: and that the *manner* in which the truths of Chriſtianity have been conveyed, can be defended againſt the cavils of infidelity, without any hardy oppoſition to the general ſenſe of Mankind.

ERRATA.

Page 6. Note. l. 8. col. 2. for reſiſtendo armis duritie ſuorum, read, reſiſtendo ictibus duritie armorum ſuorum.

P. 34. l. 10. for, the definition, read, as the definition, &c.

——l. 13. for, the introducer of it, read, the introducing it.

P. 35. l. 6. for, *had* endeavoured, read, *hath* endeavoured,

——l. 10. dele then

P. 49. l. 9. for, may here, read, may not here, &c.

P. 95. l. 8. for, *and* made up, read, *as* made up

A

DISSERTATION

ON THE

PRINCIPLES

OF

ELOQUENCE, &c.

CHAP. I.

THE great author of our being hath ſo conſtituted this human frame, that our ſenſitive faculties are ſcarcely ever employed without ſome degree of emotion, ſome ſpecies of pleaſure or pain, ſome affection or paſſion. In our infant days, before words are learned, or the organs formed to utter articulate ſounds, we obſerve ſtrong natural ſigns of ſuch emotion in the looks and voice. As we advance in life, and examine the

objects of ſenſe with greater accuracy, when we are enabled to compare them, and to perceive their beauty, their grandeur, or other like ideas, delight and wonder are their neceſſary attendants; and ſuch forcible impreſſions are inſtantly, and inſtinctively communicated to the voice and language.

So that the language of man in a ſolitary ſtate, before it was directed to inform and perſuade his fellow-creatures, muſt have been in ſome degree vehement and animated, the effuſions of a mind not in the torpid ſtate of indifference, but moved and agitated by all the objects which ſurrounded him, and oftentimes eager to expreſs it's affections. Accordingly the great Engliſh Poet, when he deſcribes our firſt parent juſt created, and ſurveying the magnificence of that theatre in which he was placed, makes him break out into the following *eloquent* addreſs, as the *natural* expreſſion of his rapture.

——— Thou Sun! —— fair light!
And thou enlighten'd Earth, ſo freſh and gay!
Ye hills, and dales, ye rivers, woods, and plains!
And ye that live and move, fair creatures! tell,
Tell, if ye ſaw, how came I thus? how here?
Not of myſelf: by ſome great maker, then,
In goodneſs and in pow'r præeminent.
Tell me how may I know him, how adore,
From whom I have that thus I move and live,
And feel that I am happier than I know. MILTON.

The exerciſe and improvement of reaſon, whatever effect it may have in regulating and directing the paſſions, neither ſeeks nor tends to ſuppreſs them. Every acceſſion of knowledge is in itſelf pleaſing and affecting. Even Mathematical truths

truths, which have the leaſt intercourſe with human paſſions, are not received with cold indifference: when conſidered as purely ſpeculative, without any attention to their uſe or application, we are delighted with them; nay ſometimes even tranſported by what metaphyſical Critics call the *beauty* of *Theorem*.

And if truths meerly ſpeculative have ſuch an effect upon the mind, much leſs can thoſe be received with lifeleſs indifference, which have an obvious connection with our intereſt and happineſs. Informations of this kind, whether from ſenſe or reaſon, are ever attended with joy, pleaſure, fear, hope, deſire, or averſion: and theſe are paſſions which cannot be ſuppreſſed: they agitate our whole frame, and break out involuntarily in our looks, our voice, and language.

That intercourſe with mankind, in which we are engaged, calls forth another tribe of paſſions and affections, as anger, indignation, benevolence, ſympathy, and all thoſe numerous emotions which are excited by the appearance of aimable or odious qualities in our fellow-creatures, by the occupations, intereſts and conteſts of ſocial life. We know from general and uniform experience, nay we feel that theſe naturally and unavoidably produce an elevation or vehemence of ſpeech, or a tender and melancholy flow of words, or a diſorder and abruptneſs of diſcourſe, lively images and ſimilitudes, glowing expreſſions, or ſome other of thoſe modes which Rhetoricians call *tropical* and *figurative*. As Nature hath formed us to theſe agitations of mind, ſo it is nature herſelf, who thus

—— effert animi motus, INTERPRETE LINGUA. HOR.

Metaphor, Similitude, and Allegory, tho' ſome of them

are ranked, by teachers of Rhetoric, among the tropes of meer ornament, have yet been ever uſed moſt frequently, and with greateſt freedom, by thoſe whoſe underſtandings, manners, and languages are too rude and unrefined for ornament or artifice. The origin of tropical expreſſion is deduced from neceſſity and the deficiences of human language, with the utmoſt juſtneſs and elegance of reaſoning, in the fourth book of the DIVINE LEGATION of Moſes demonſtrated: and we may ſafely ſubſcribe to the determination of the learned author, that * "the firſt ſimple ages, uncultivated and immerged in ſenſe, could expreſs their rude conceptions of abſtract ideas and the reflex operations of the mind only by material images; which ſo applied became Metaphors:" and that, "this, and not the warmth of a poetic fancy, as is commonly ſuppoſed, was the true origin of figurative expreſſion."

*V. 2. p. 148. Ed. Lond. 8vo. 1742.

And it may be affirmed, I preſume, that there is no language however cultivated and improved, which is not ſtill defective and confined; ſo as to fail in natural and proper expreſſions on a great variety of occaſions. We know that when that of the Romans had attained to it's greateſt perfection, Quinctilian confeſſes, † "NECESSITATE nos *durum* hominem atque *aſperum* [dicimus.] Non enim proprium erat quod daremus hiſce affectibus nomen." And in another place, ‡ "res plurimæ CARENT appellationibus, ut eas *neceſſe* ſit *tranſferre*."

† Inſt. Orat. L. 8. C. 6.

‡ Ibid. L. 12. C. 10.

Then, as to individuals, there are but few who can have acquired their own native language in it's utmoſt extent. And the greateſt part of mankind, in every age and nation however enlightened and refined, ſeem to be ſtill in that rude ſtate which the learned author of the DIVINE LEGATION

ſpeaks

ſpeaks of, * where " *language* is too narrow, and the minds " of men too undiſciplined, to ſupport only abſtract reaſoning, and a direct addreſs." They are themſelves principally influenced by their paſſions and affections; and they ſpeak to the paſſions and affections of other men. Even the improved part of mankind, if engaged in the buſineſs and tranſactions of the world, muſt be moved and agitated, and their ſpeech muſt be conſonant to their feelings, and adapted to their occaſions; not always to convey diſtinct and ſcientific propoſitions, not to inculcate ſtrict and formal reaſonings, not to expreſs particular ideas with a philoſophical preciſion, but, to diſplay ſome quality, character, or temper, to conciliate the affections of their hearers, to alarm their fears, to enliven their hopes, to move their pity, to awaken their indignation, and to rouſe them to action: all which is conſtantly effected by the uſe of words and forms, which make perhaps the greateſt part of all languages, and yet when diſtinctly conſidered, are found to convey no preciſe and exact information.

* Vol. 2. p. 87.

Juſt at the time when Achilles is making dreadful ravages in the Trojan army, the poet makes Hector addreſs himſelf to his Soldiers, with all the force and energy of figurative ſpeech.

Τοῦ δ' ἐγὼ ἀντίος εἶμι, καὶ εἰ πυρὶ χεῖρας ἐοικεν·
Εἰ πυρὶ χεῖρας ἔοικε, μένος δ' αἴθωνι σιδήρῳ. ILIAD. Υ. l. 371.

Nor from yon boaſter ſhall your Chief retire:
Not tho' his heart were ſteel, his hands were fire!
That fire, that ſteel your Hector ſhould withſtand;
And brave that vengeful heart, that dreadful hand. POPE.

† A learned critic obſerves on this paſſage, that if we examine the ſeveral phraſes in the original, in order to know what particular Ideas the poet annexed to each, we ſhall find ourſelves involved in ſome difficulty. He notes ‡ the equivocation in each, and doubts whether the Poet himſelf, were he to return to life, could ſay, whether he had all the different ſenſes in view, or any one, or which of them. Hence he infers the obſcurity of ſuch modes of ſpeech, which he ſeems to attribute to the artifice of thoſe who uſe them. But the paſſage here quoted ſeems but a bad proof of ſuch artifice. The ſpeaker is repreſented as too violently agitated to uſe his terms with preciſion, much leſs to concert means of deception. Nor are his words obſcure or inſignificant: for they expreſs his paſſions not only with clearneſs but with energy. His purpoſe was to impreſs the minds of his hearers with a lively ſenſe of his own undaunted valour, and to encourage

† Johan. Clerici Artis Criticæ, Tom. 1. p. 2. C. 15.

‡ Si ſingula verba excutiamus ut accurate nôrimus quas notiones iis ſubjecerit poëta, deprehendemus, non levem eſſe difficultatem. 1. ἄνλιος εἶμι an ſimpliciter ſignificat *contra ire*, an vero ea locutione continetur *reſiſtendi* aut *aggrediendi* animus? 2. ἄνλιος εἶμι eſtne ſolitus ſum contra eum conſiſtere, antehac contra conſtiti, vel illico hoc faciam ſi neceſſe ſit, vel decrevi facere, & certo faciam? 3. Quid eſt πυρὶ χεῖρας ἐοικέναι; eſtne manuum motu celeritatem ignis æquare; an manu id præſtare quod ignis facit; an manus habere æque formidandas ac ignem? — 4. An Hector vult dicere revera Achillem πυρὶ χεῖρας ἐοικέναι, an vero quamvis manibus ignem æquaret, ſe non detrectaturum pugnam; nedum ut cum qualis erat fugeret? 5. Μενος αἰθωνι σιδήρῳ ſimile, quanam in re eſt? an in gravitate ictuum, an in amoliendis illatis plagis, aut reſiſtendo armis duritie ſuorum? 6. Denique αἴθων σιδήρος eſtne ſplendens gladius, aut quodlibet ferrum, adeo ut αἴθων ſit epitheton otioſum; an vero eſt *candens ferrum*, cui ſimilis ſit aliqua in re Achilles? Quis dicet an Homerus omnes haſce σχέσεις in animo habuerit, an aliquot tantum, & quænam eæ ſint? *Ibid.*

them

them to fight bravely under his conduct. For this purpoſe he uſes ſtriking images and an earneſtneſs of repetition naturally ariſing from the vehemence of his own emotion. And this mode of ſpeech is truly forcible and affecting, altho' the words may be uſed without diſtinct ideas annexed to each, and heard without exciting ſuch diſtinct ideas.

Inſtances of the ſame kind are common in all languages. Shakeſpeare repreſents King Henry enflamed with anger, and thus addreſſing himſelf to Hotſpur.

> Send me your priſoners with the ſpeedieſt means,
> Or you ſhall hear in ſuch a kind from me,
> As will diſpleaſe you.———

Here we have no diſtinct kind or degree of danger ſuggeſted by this threat: and the ſpeaker himſelf might have been in the diſpoſition of King Lear when he exclaims

> ——— I will do ſuch things!
> What they are, yet, I know not.——

His words ſignify the indignation and reſentment in his mind: his intention is to inſpire a proud ſubject with dread, and to prompt him to a ready compliance with the royal will, and at the ſame time to expreſs a conſciouſneſs of his own dignity. And the force of his language in expreſſing this dignity of character, and in exciting terror and ſubmiſſion, is even encreaſed by repeating the menace with ſtill leſs preciſion,

> Send us your priſoners, or, *you'll hear of it.*

If then, paſſions and affections are naturally excited in the human breaſt, and have the principal influence on human actions; if they have their peculiar modes of ſpeech, not in-

vented

vented for the purpoſe of pleaſing, but ariſing from neceſſity, and of neceſſity holding a diſtinguiſhed place in every language; above all, if we are to conclude with the acute and philoſophical Biſhop of Cloyne, that * " the communication " of ideas is not the chief or only end of language, but that " there are other ends, as the raiſing ſome paſſion, the exciting " to, or deterring from an action, the putting the mind into " ſome particular diſpoſition, to which the former is in many " caſes barely ſubſervient, and ſometimes entirely omit- " ted,"——It follows that ſuch modes of addreſs as anſwer theſe latter, and (according to this anthor) the *chief* ends of language, that is, ſuch modes as are generally called *eloquent*, cannot be deemed the artificial abuſe of words, but are really congenial and eſſential to human ſpeech.

* Principles of human Knowledge, Introd. Sect. 20.

CHAP. II.

CHAP. II.

WE may extend this enquiry ſtill farther, and examine thoſe forms of figurative language, which Rhetoricians point out as inſtances of moſt exquiſite addreſs and refinement in the Orator. A little attention will convince us that theſe, as they were not originally the inventions of artifice, but naturally and neceſſarily aroſe, in the natural and neceſſary progreſs of human ſpeech, ſo they owe the principal part of their beauty, and their whole power of affecting, to their being conceived as the obvious, unſtudied reſult of a mind labouring with violent emotions, and earneſt to convey the whole force of it's conceptions.

One of the higheſt ornaments of Style is ſaid to ariſe from a mixture and combination of Metaphor, Similitude and Allegory. Of this we have an inſtance in the following paſſage from Cicero, in his oration for Muræna.

" Quod fretum, quem Euripum tot motus, tantas, tam
" varias habere putatis agitationes fluctuum, quantas pertur-
" bationes, et quantos æſtus habet ratio Comitiorum? Dies
" intermiſſus unus aut Nox interpoſita ſæpe perturbat omnia,

" et totam opinionem parva nonnunquam commutat aura " rumoris."

Is the beauty of this admired paſſage derived wholly from the ſtriking images and exactneſs of ſimilitude? Theſe may be beautiful, or rather grand and affecting. But this grandeur, this power of affecting, is ſo cloſely connected with propriety and juſtneſs of application, that the very ſame combination of figures, uſed on a mean and unworthy ſubject, would diſpleaſe and even excite our ridicule. The effect would be nearly the ſame, were it ſo applied or introduced as to betray an affectation of ornament.—But this ſenſe of propriety, and this diſguſt at affectation, plainly imply, that there are paſſions and ſentiments to which the boldeſt and livelieſt ſtrains of Eloquence are peculiarly ſuited; which cannot be juſtly expreſſed but by ſuch glowing forms of ſpeech as are here exemplified; that theſe have their genuine force and ſignification previous to all fictitious abuſe: they are in themſelves the real and natural effuſions of the mind, elſe hypocriſy and affectation never would attempt to imitate them, and never could be detected by an injudicious imitation.

If one ſingle violent emotion hath ſuch an effect in warming and animating the expreſſion, what may be expected from that conflict of paſſions, which oftentimes rages in the human breaſt? It extorts from us all that boldneſs and affecting vehemence of diction, all thoſe hardy figures, which Rhetoricians have ſo exactly analyzed, and marked by various names, as the moſt diſtinguiſhed inſtances of the oratorial art. Epic and Dramatic writers of all languages have aſſigned ſuch modes of expreſſion, and ſuch only, to Characters ſo circumſtanced and affected. Let us conſider the paſſionate ſpeeches

and

and ſoliloquies of Dido in that temper of mind which the poet thus deſcribes.

——————— Æſtuat ingens
Imo in corde *pudor*, mixtoque *inſania luctu* ;
Et *furiis* agitatus *amor*, et *conſcia virtus*.

Perhaps there is no one ſpecies of figurative ſtyle, which we do not find in theſe ſpeeches : the lively interrogation, the bitter irony, the paſſionate exclamation, Apoſtrophe, Proſopopæia ; in a word, all the powers and all the ornaments of Eloquence. The leaſt feeling muſt determine us to pronounce them highly pleaſing and affecting, and to admire the wonderful addreſs of the poet. But why are theſe ſpeeches pleaſing and affecting ? Becauſe they are exactly *natural* ; they are what we call *the language of the heart*. Their form and manner are the ſame in which ſuch paſſions are ever expreſſed by all nations and languages in real life. And why do we admire the poet ? Becauſe his obſervation hath been juſt, and his imitation not only lively but accurate. He hath deſcribed the real emotions of the human heart, and expreſſed them in their real and proper language. It is JUST : it is NATURAL. — This is the praiſe given to the poet ; and this is the teſt by which we try his performance.

CHAP. III.

CHAP. III.

SO general is the conviction of Mankind, as to the real and natural ſignification of tender and impaſſioned, vehement and animated forms of elocution, that theſe are conſidered as marks of ſincerity; and every thing cold and unaffecting in words and action, where the ſubject is of an intereſting nature, we ſometimes find urged as a proof of hypocriſy and falſehood. The firſt thing we look for in any perſon, who profeſſes to be affected, is the ſigns of paſſion, which nature herſelf hath impreſſed on the countenance and voice, the glaring look of *anger*, the ſtern brow of *indignation*, the

— windy ſuſpiration of forc'd breath,
—— the fruitful river in the eye,
* *
Together with all forms, moods, ſhews of *grief*. SHAK.

Altho' they are actions which, as the poet obſerves, *a man might play*, or counterfeit, like all the other marks of truth.

In the tragedy of Richard the Second, the Dutcheſs of York thus impeaches the ſincerity of her huſband.

Pleads

Pleads he in earneſt? look upon his face.
His eyes do drop no tears; his pray'r's in jeſt.
His words come from his mouth: our's from our breaſt.
He prays but faintly, and would be deny'd:
We pray with heart and ſoul ——

In like manner, Demoſthenes pleads againſt his adverſary in the famous cauſe relative to the CROWN.

Πολλὰ τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἄλλα κατηγορηκότος αὐτοῦ καὶ κατεψευσμένου, ἓν μάλιστ' ἐθαύμασα ἁπάντων· ὅτι τῶν συμβεβηκότων τότε τῇ πόλει ἀναμνησθεὶς οὐχ ὡς ἂν εὔνους ὢν δίκαιος πολίτης ἔσχε τὴν γνώμην, οὐδ' ἐδάκρυσεν, οὐδ' ἔπαθεν οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον τῇ ψυχῇ· ἀλλ' ἐπάρας τὴν φωνὴν, καὶ γεγηθὼς, καὶ λαρυγγίζων, ᾤετο μὲν ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖν δηλονότι, δεῖγμα δὲ ἐξέφερε καθ' ἑαυτοῦ ὅτι τοῖς γεγενημένοις ἀνιαροῖς οὐδὲν ὁμοίως ἔχει τοῖς ἄλλοις. DEMOST. Ed. Taylor. T. 2. p. 579.

" Of all the various inſtances of *falſehood* in this his pro-
" ſecution, one there is which moſt ſurprizes me. In recall-
" ing the misfortunes of that fatal period to our minds, he
" hath felt no part of that ſenſibility, which beſpeaks a zea-
" lous or an honeſt citizen. He never dropped one tear;
" never diſcovered the leaſt tender emotion. No! his voice
" was elevated, he exulted, he ſtrained and ſwelled, with all
" the triumph of a man who had convicted me of ſome no-
" torious offence. But in this he hath given evidence againſt
" himſelf, that he is not affected by our public calamities
" in the ſame manner with his Fellow-citizens."

But it is not only from the countenance, the tones or inflections of the voice, that we judge of the ſincerity of a ſpeaker, but from his ſtyle and language. The ſtory of the Athenian Orator and his Client is well known. The man

explains

explains the injuries he had received coldly and plainly. Demoſthenes declares that he could not give credit to the tale. Thus provoked, the Client raiſes his voice, and his paſſion breaks forth in trope and figure. The orator inſtantly declares himſelf convinced.

Calidius the Roman Pleader was devoted to Atticiſm; and never ventured to make the leaſt excurſion beyond the ſtrict bounds of clearneſs and preciſion. He accuſed one Gallius of an attempt to poiſon him, and offered the fulleſt proofs of his guilt. But Cicero tells us, that when he came to anſwer him as advocate for the accuſed, he urged it as a proof of the falſehood of this charge, that Calidius had pleaded, (to uſe his own expreſſions) tam ſolute, tam leniter, tam oſcitanter; that neither his action nor his ſtyle beſpoke that violence of emotion, which ſuch an event, had it really happened, muſt have excited in his mind.

Tu iſtuc M. Calidi, niſi fingeres, ſic ageres? —— ubi dolor? ubi ardor animi? *qui etiam ex infantium ingeniis elicere voces et querelas ſolet.* De clar. orat. C. 80. Ed. Oliv.

It is by no means neceſſary for the preſent argument, that the proof here urged by theſe great maſters, ſhould be infallible and irrefragable. It is ſufficient that it hath a foundation in reaſon, and is generally conſonant to obſervation and experience. He, whoſe Elocution is not warmed and animated by an affecting ſubject, may give other proofs of his ſincerity, tho' he fails in poſſeſſing his hearers with an immediate preſumption in his favour. He who uſes the language of paſſion to conceal falſehood, and miſguide his hearers, may be ſtill liable to detection, tho' he hath inſpired them with ſentiments favourable to his wicked purpoſe. The final prevalence of reaſon or information in either caſe is by no means

means an argument againſt what hath been advanced of the natural and generally received ſignification of ſuch modes of ſpeech as have been deſcribed. And in the caſe of falſehood and deception, it is to be obſerved, that the natural connexion, which every man feels in himſelf, and diſcovers in his fellows, between a ſincere warmth and force of ſentiment, and a lively and impaſſioned form of expreſſion, is the very circumſtance which renders Eloquence ſo dangerous a weapon, when directed by a lively fancy joined with a fraudulent or malignant heart.

Tacitus gives us the hiſtory of a mutiny raiſed in a Roman army by ſome ſeditious harangues and cabals. The mutineers are joined by a party ſtill more turbulent and licentious. The general interpoſes and endeavours to bring the chief leaders to juſtice; but their aſſociates take the alarm, fly to their relief and reſcue them. In the midſt of their tumultous exultation, a common ſoldier raiſes himſelf upon their ſhoulders, is advanced before the general's pavilion, and addreſſes himſelf to the crowd in the following manner. *

" Yes, my fellow ſoldiers! You have reſtored theſe our " unoffending, our miſerable companions, to freedom and " ſecurity. But ſay, who ſhall reſtore to my brother his dear " life? Who ſhall give my brother back to theſe arms? He " was diſpatched to us from the camp of Germanicus, upon

* Vos quidem inquit, his innocentibus et miſerrimis lucem et ſpiritum reddidiſtis: ſed quis fratri meo vitam, quis fratrem mihi reddit? quem miſſum ad vos a Germanico exercitu de communibus commodis, nocte proxima jugulavit per gladiatores ſuos, quos in exitium militum habet atque armat. Reſponde Blæſſe, ubi cadaver abjeceris? ne hoſtes quidem ſepulturæ invident. Cum oculis, cum lacrymis dolorem meum implevero, me quoque trucidari jube; dum interfectos nullum ob ſcelus, ſed quia utilitati legionum conſulebamus, hi ſepeliant. TACIT. ANN. I.

" affairs

" affairs which concern the intereſts of us all; and laſt " night, did this man's emiſſaries bury their weapons in his " throat; thoſe bloody ruffians, whom he keeps prepared " in arms, to wreak his vengeance on the ſoldiers. —— Tell " me Blæſus, where have you caſt out his corpſe?—Even " the enemies we fight againſt allow the rites of inter- " ment.—Let me indulge my grief in kiſſing the remains, " and bathing them with my tears. Then, iſſue forth your " orders, and let me too be murdered. And let theſe our " companions conſign us to one grave; two wretches who " died for no crime but that of zeal and affection for the " army."

The effect of this pathetic Eloquence was alarming and terrible; and the conſequences we are told might have been fatal to the general, had not the impoſture been inſtantly detected. But it may be ſaid, that the perſons, to whom this ſpeech was addreſſed, were ignorant and turbulent; ready of themſelves to catch the flame of paſſion. —— Let us then ſuppoſe a perſon of the greateſt refinement and moſt conſummate judgment, temperate, diſpaſſionate, and clear of all the popular infection, preſent in this aſſembly. Would this ſpeech, delivered with all the affecting vehemence of action, have been heard by ſuch a man with abſolute indifference? Would he have at once conſidered this manner of addreſs, as *a perſuaſive turn given to the elocution, to ſupply the defect of an inward conſcious perſuaſion in the ſpeaker?* On the contrary, even on the firſt peruſal of the narrative, I preſume it will be deemed no great argument of the reader's ſenſibility, that he does not feel a conſiderable degree of emotion, and an impatience to be informed of the final event. A judicious obſerver might have recollected, that the groſſeſt falſe-

hood

hood and hypocriſy have frequently aſſumed the ſtrongeſt marks of truth, and hence might have ſuſpended his opinion of this ſoldier's veracity; yet ſtill he would have agreed with Quinctilian, Quid enim aliud eſt cauſæ ut *lugentes* utique in recenti dolore *diſertiſſime* quædam exclamare videantur, et *ira* nonnunquam indoctis quoque *eloquentiam* faciat, quam quod illis ineſt *vis mentis* et *veritas ipſa morum?* (L. 6. C. 2.) And far from grounding any ſuſpicion of falſehood meerly on the paſſionate ſtyle and manner of his harangue, I preſume he would have concurred with the vulgar, in conſidering this as the immediate evidence given of his ſincerity. And if he had proceeded to examine this *evidence* with more acuteneſs and penetration than the vulgar, it muſt have been by looking for ſomething *unnatural* and *affected* in the ſpeech and action; ſomething which a man, really afflicted by the death of his brother, could not have expreſſed, ſomething like the unnatural exclamations of MACBETH, and his affected diſtraction at the King's Murder,

——— Here lay Duncan,
His ſilver ſkin laced with his golden Blood, &c.

Which, as the learned commentator obſerves, "diſcover the "declaimer not to be affected in the manner he would re-"preſent himſelf.

CHAP. IV.

SO extenſive is the figurative part of every language, ſo obvious to be adopted, ſo unavoidable, upon all occaſions, that even ſtrict and ſevere reaſoning cannot always be ſupported without it's aid. We even frequently find grave philoſophical writers warning their readers againſt the deceits of Eloquence, and at the ſame time not aſhamed to make uſe of it's moſt refined arts. Even Mr. LOCKE, that enemy to figurative ſpeech, ſlides imperceptibly into thoſe paths, from whence he is ſo ſolicitous to divert mankind.—— "The "horizon between the enlightened and dark part of things *". "—— Eloquence, like the fair ſex, hath too prevailing "beauties †". —— "Speech, the great bond which holds "ſociety together, the common conduit whereby men con-"vey their knowledge — whoſe fountains cannot be cor-"rupted, tho' the pipes may be ſtopped or broken ‡"—— Here are tropes and figures, which ſurely do not *inſinuate wrong ideas*, do not *miſlead the judgment*, are not *perfect cheat* ‖.

* Eſſay on human underſtanding, B. 1. C. 1.
† B. 3. C. 8.
‡ Ibid. C. 9.
‖ Vide B. 3. C. 8.

The

The Lord Biſhop of GLOUCESTER everywhere abounds with lively figures and animated forms of ſpeech. In that very part of his diſcourſe on the DOCTRINE OF GRACE, where he labours to expoſe the weakneſs of objecting the want of Eloquence in the Holy Scriptures, by condemning it as imaginary and fantaſtical, and at beſt the inſtrument of fraud and falſehood, he hath conveyed his argument in all the moſt ſtriking forms of Eloquence, with the ſpirit and energy of an ancient Orator.

" Should therefore the Eaſtern Eloquence be employed?
" But this would be too inflated and gigantic for the Weſt.
" Should it be the Weſtern? But this would be too cold and
" torpid for the Eaſt. Or ſuppoſe the generic Eloquence of
" the moſt poliſhed nations was to be preferred. Which
" ſpecies of it was to be employed? The rich exuberance of
" the Aſiatic Greeks? or the dry conciſeneſs of the Spartans?
" The pure and poignant eaſe and flowing ſweetneſs of the
" Attic modulation? or the ſtrength and grave ſeverity of
" the Roman tone? Or ſhould all give way to that African
" torrrent, which aroſe from the fermented mixture of the
" dregs of Greece and Italy, and ſoon overflowed the Church
" with Theological conceits, in a ſparkling luxuriancy of
" thought, and a ſombrous rankneſs of expreſſion? Thus
" various are the ſpecies! *

Again—— " But it will be ſaid, Are there not ſome more
" ſubſtantial principles of Eloquence common to all? —
" Without doubt there are. Why then ſhould not theſe
" have been employed to do credit to the Apoſtolic inſpira-
" tion? For good reaſons reſpecting both the ſpeaker and
" the hearers. For what *is* Eloquence, but a perſuaſive turn
" given to the elocution to ſupply that inward, that con-

* Doct. of Grace, L. 1. C. 9. p. 56.

" ſcious

" ſcious perſuaſion of the ſpeaker, ſo neceſſary to gain a fair
" hearing? But the firſt preachers of the Goſpel did not
" need a ſuccedaneum to that inward conſcious perſuaſion.
" And what is the end of Eloquence, even when it extends
" no farther than to thoſe more general principles, but to
" ſtifle reaſon, and inflame the paſſions? But the propaga-
" tion of Chriſtian truths indiſpenſably requires the aid of
" reaſon, &c.

Can any thing be more brilliant, more enlivened, more truly Rhetorical, than theſe paſſages? What then are we to think of the writer and his intentions? Is he really ſincere in this his reaſoning? Or are theſe eloquent forms of ſpeech ſo many marks of falſehood? Were they aſſumed as *a ſuccedaneum to conſcious perſuaſion?* And is the end and deſign of them to *ſtifle reaſon, and to inflame the paſſions?* —The Right Reverend Author might fairly anſwer, that the colouring here given to his argument was not at all the effect of art, much leſs of any inſidious deſign; that his conceptions were clear and lively; that the importance of the ſubject had made the due impreſſion upon his mind; that his ſtyle of conſequence became naturally warm and vehement; and I preſume his Lordſhip would not allow that the ſoundneſs of his reaſoning was at all impaired by the boldneſs of his figures. The inference then is unavoidable, that ſuch modes of eloquence, as he hath here aſſumed, are the neceſſary reſult of forcible impreſſions, and inlivened ſentiments. Juſt as the moſt oratorial, nay, the fineſt poetical figures are the natural and proper language of tenderneſs, pity, and affection *. All theſe are therefore an eſſential part, not

* For this, we have an authority more than human. HE in whoſe mouth was NO GUILE, laments, in this language, over the devoted city of

not an accidental abuſe, of human ſpeech. Their natural power and tendency is not to betray or to deceive, but their primary and proper ſignification is the true and real ſentiments, diſpoſitions, and affections of the ſpeaker, tho' like other marks of truth, they may be aſſumed by hypocriſy, and perverted to the purpoſes of fraud and deception.

The obſervation of theſe workings of nature, theſe unſtudied expreſſions of her affections and feelings, firſt taught men to improve their powers, to arrange, direct, and diſcipline them. And in this there appears nothing *eſſentially* repugnant to uncorrupted nature, no more than in * bracing the limbs, ſtrengthening the body, and heightening the complexion by exerciſe. It is not indeed to be expected, that Man ſhall ever invariably employ his powers, either natural or acquired, to the pureſt purpoſes. A grave and wiſe tribunal might have obſerved and guarded againſt the inconveniencies of admitting inſidious men to divert the attention from ſome important point of enquiry, or to inflame the paſſions, where the judgment only was to be informed: a babling Sophiſt might boaſt, that he could confound the diſtinctions between truth and falſehood, by the multitude of his words; or an eloquent pleader might triumph in concealing the weakneſs of his cauſe in the ſplendor of his harangue. Yet the obvious diſtinction

of Jeruſalem.—— " He beheld the " city and wept over it, ſaying, If " thou hadſt known, even thou, at " leaſt in this thy day, the things which " belong unto thy peace! —— But " now they are hid from thine eyes. St. LUKE xix. 41, 42.

" O Jeruſalem, Jeruſalem! which " killeſt the prophets, and ſtoneſt them " that are ſent unto thee, how often " would I have gathered thy children " together as a hen doth gather her " brood under her wings, and ye " would not"! St. LUKE xiii. 34.

* Nam & lacertos exercitatione conſtringere, & augere vires, et colorem trahere *naturale* eſt. Quinct. L 12. C 10.

between

between the legitimate application and the abuſe of Eloquence ſtill remains, as in the caſe of every other human accompliſhment. The Rhetoricians themſelves are perpetually inculcating this diſtinction. *They even pronounce, that none but the good man can attain to perfect Eloquence. If they direct that the Orator ſhall be ever careful to betray no appearance of artifice, it is not that they are conſcious that Eloquence *is* in itſelf inſidious, and its *end* immoral, but for another reaſon much more honourable to their profeſſion, which they expreſſly ſpecify.—— †Striking figures and graceful forms of elocution, have ſo great an effect, when introduced with judgment, that men of vanity and falſe taſte are apt to conſider theſe as the whole of Eloquence, and imagine that they are only to collect ſuch graces, and to diſplay them to the beſt advantage.

But critics inform them that in this they betray their want of real feeling, and therefore never can affect: that an oſtentation of art is the mark of falſehood and deceit: but, that

* Quinct. Inſt. Orat. L. 12. C. 1.

† Ego illud de figuris adjiciam breviter, ſicut ornant orationem opportune poſitæ, ita ineptiſſimas eſſe cum immodice petuntur. Sunt, qui neglecto rerum pondere & viribus ſententiarum, ſi vel inania verba in hos modos depravarint, ſummos ſe judicent artifices, ideoque non deſinunt eas nectere. Sed ne hæ quidem quæ recte fiunt denſandæ ſunt nimis. Nam et vultus mutatio, occulorumque conjectus multum in actu valet: ſed ſi quis ducere os exquiſitis modis, et frontis ac luminum inconſtantia trepidare non deſinat, rideatur. Et oratio habeat rectam quandam velut faciem: quæ ut ſtupore immobili rigere non debebit; ita ſæpius in ea, quam natura dedit, ſpecie continenda eſt. Sciendum vero in primis, quid quiſque in orando poſtulet locus, quid perſona, quid tempus. Major enim pars harum figurarum poſita eſt in delectatione. Ubi vero atrocitate, invidia, miſeratione pugnandum eſt, quis ferat contrapoſitis, & pariter cadentibus, & conſimilibus iraſcentem, flentem, rogantem? cum in his rebus *cura verborum deroget affectibus fidem:* & ubicunque *ars oſtentatur*, *veritas* abeſſe videatur. Quinct. L. 9. C. 3.

perfect

perfect Eloquence is, and must be, the expreſſion of TRUTH: that if they would perſuade and influence, their language muſt be that of nature; and that whatever perſuades and influences is the ELOQUENCE OF NATURE, and nothing elſe*.

* Quo quiſque plus efficit dicendo, dicit. Quinct. L. 12. C. 10. hoc magis ſecundum *naturæ eloquentiam*

CHAP. V.

CHAP. V.

BUT here we are to take notice of that very ſevere cenſure, which the Right Reverend Author has paſſed on Tropes and Figures of compoſition. *"As theſe," ſaith his Lordſhip, "are a deviation from the principles of Metaphyſics and "Logic, they are frequently vicious. And this the great Ma-"ſter [Quintilian] freely confeſſeth."——Let us conſider theſe aſſertions ſeparately.

* Doctr. of Grace. B. 1. C 9. p. 58.

In the firſt place it were to be wiſhed that his Lordſhip had pleaſed to expreſs his ſentiment with a little more preciſion; that we might have clearly and diſtinctly been informed, when, and whom, to condemn or to acquit: as all men, who have ever written or ſpoken, have *frequently* uſed this mode of elocution, which is ſaid to be *frequently* vicious. The heathen poet ſpeaks of a river †*ſpurning with indignation* at a bridge: the evangeliſt ſpeaks of a ſhip not being able to ‡*look* a ſtorm *in the face*. The deviation from Metaphyſical principles is

† —— Pontem indignatus Araxes. Aeneid. L. 8. l. 728.

‡ Συναρπασθέντος δὲ τοῦ πλοίου, καὶ μὴ δυναμένου ΑΝΤΟΦΘΑΛΜΕΙΝ τῷ ἀνέμῳ.——Act. 27. 15.

equal

equal in both. In the poet we may allow it to be vicious: but we muſt be more cautious in deciding on the character either of the evangeliſt, or of his Style. We ſee then, that in a poſition ſo bold, and in it's application ſomewhat dangerous, bounds and diſtinctions ſhould have been aſcertained with exactneſs.

And what makes this poſition ſtill more hardy is, that however the concluſion ſeems confined and reſtrained by the addition of that qualifying word [*frequently*,] yet the premiſes are general and unlimited. It is aſſerted without any reſtriction, that Figurative compoſition is a deviation from the principles of Metaphyſics and Logic. If then it be vicious *as* it is, i. e. *becauſe* [*quatenus*] it is ſuch a deviation, it muſt be not only *frequently* but *always* vicious; a very ſevere cenſure denounced againſt almoſt every ſpeaker, and every writer, both ſacred and profane, that ever appeared in the world.

But what is this deviation from the principles of Metaphyſics, which is charged on figurative compoſition? Perhaps the joining of attributes and ſubjects ſtrictly and naturally incongruous; the repreſenting things inanimate as living and acting; and ſuch like. But it might deſerve the attention of the moſt rigid Philoſopher, that in all ſuch caſes

—— More is meant than meets the ear. MILT.

And that the ſobereſt good ſenſe, and even a philoſophical accuracy of thought, may be conveyed by the livelieſt figures. To inſtance in thoſe of poetry as moſt daring, and ſeemingly the moſt flagrant violations of Metaphyſical truth. If a ſpeaker were to tell us in ſimple forms of ſpeech, that a melancholy ſtate of mind was not natural to man, was ſhocking, and in ſome ſort monſtrous, that it was produced by dark and gloomy ſcenes, which are apt to affect the imagination, and to make

us fancy frightful and dangerous objects near us, which have no real exiſtence;—— This would be readily allowed juſt and reaſonable, conſonant to experience and the nature of things. But the ſentiment is the ſame, the proper ſignification of the poet's language preciſely the ſame, when, to convey it in a manner more lively and affecting, he addreſſes himſelf to that imaginary perſonage;

——— Loathed Melancholy!
Of Cerberus and blackeſt midnight born,
In Stygian cave forlorn;
'Mongſt horrid ſhapes, and ſhrieks, and ſights unholy.
L'ALLEGRO.

And places her in

Some uncouth cell:

Where, if I may be allowed the expreſſion, he makes darkneſs *viſible*, by the bold creation of another perſonage, whoſe whole power in poſſeſſing the imagination with falſe fears and ideal dangers, he fully expreſſes by one happy epithet.

Where brooding darkneſs ſpreads her JEALOUS wings.

The poet who thus gives a *local habitation* to Melancholy, in the like adventurous manner aſſigns to Mirth, parents, being, form, corporeal and mental qualities.

Zephyr with Aurora playing,
As he met her once a maying,
There on beds of violets blue,
And freſh blown roſes waſh'd in dew,
Fill'd her with thee a daughter fair;
So buxom, blithe, and debonair. L'ALLEG.

I remember to have ſomewhere found this paſſage analyzed, and examined with great ſeverity, by ſome votary of ſcience.—

" How

" How abſurd and irrational! A breath of wind cohabits " with an hour of the day, and begets a paſſion or a temper " of the mind. Can any thing be really more wild and " extravagant?" —— But if ſuch friends of unadorned truth, and ſevere exactneſs of thought and language, had not been ſo alarmed at theſe airy forms, but had ventured one ſtep farther, they would have found themſelves in a region of perfect ſecurity, and that the harmleſs poet was only conducting them by a pleaſing path, to this juſt and natural ſentiment, that vernal gales and fine mornings tend to inſpire the mind with mirth and gaiety, which are very agreeable and pleaſing affections.

That ſtrict philoſophical reaſoning may be juſtly conveyed in the ſame manner, the celebrated ESSAY ON MAN is one continued proof. And the chief buſineſs of the learned Commentator has been to point out that real and ſolid knowledge, which is far from being diſguiſed, perverted, or corrupted, by paſſing thro' the medium of figurative language.

And if we conſider the boldeſt Allegories, Metaphors, and other tropes and figures, as they really are, no more than compariſons and ſimilitudes expreſſed in another form, it will appear that they are by no means ſuch daring violations of Metaphyſical truth, as they may be deemed by thoſe who attend only to their immediate appearance, inſtead of tracing them to their real and final ſignification, with the judgment and penetration of the learned Commentator above-mentioned.

In like manner I might proceed to defend this ſpecies of tropical and figurative compoſition, againſt the general charge of deviating from the principles of Logic. It doth not indeed *define* with philoſophical and logical preciſion; but it is not it's intention to *define*. It may not *divide* with ſuch accuracy as may be neceſſary in calm ſpeculation, and the inveſtigation

of truth: but this is not it's province. It's *reaſoning* however, and it's *method*, may be ſtrict and accurate.

When Turnus thus addreſſes himſelf to Drances,

——————————— Meque timoris
Argue tu Drance, quando tot ſtragis acervos
Teucrorum tua dextra dedit—— ÆNEID. xi. l. 383.

The form of expreſſion is directly contrary to the true intention of the ſpeaker; and yet the reaſoning is as juſt and accurate, as if he had proved in mode and figure that it was not proper to accuſe another of a fault which a man is guilty of himſelf.

The great Athenian derives a conſiderable part of his renown, from a ſtrict attention to clearneſs of arrangement and ſtrength of reaſoning, even in the full career of his rapid Eloquence. I ſhall take the firſt inſtance which occurs, on looking into his remains.

In the pleading relative to the CROWN, in which his whole miniſterial conduct was expoſed to the ſevereſt examination, his adverſary accuſes him as the cauſe of the defeat at Chæronea, with all it's fatal conſequences. The ſubſtance of his anſwer is as follows:

" I am not accountable for the iſſue of a battle, which is
" determined by Providence. I took every neceſſary precaution,
" and recommended ſuch meaſures as I thought honourable,
" and indeed neceſſary; and I was diligent and aſſiduous in
" contriving all human means of ſucceſs. I have therefore
" done my part, and am not to be accountable for accidents
" or for miſconduct in other men. And unfortunate as this
" event proved in ſpight of all my efforts, it might have been
" ſtill more fatal had I omitted ſuch efforts. For inſtance, if

" I had neglected to gain the Thebans, and they had joyned
" with the enemy, inſtead of receiving a defeat at ſome diſ-
" tance, ſo as to have a little reſpite for contriving means to
" prevent our total deſtruction, we ſhould have received the
" blow under the very walls of Athens, and of conſequence
" have been irreparably ruined."

The argument here ſeems to be urged clearly and juſtly; but far from being impaired by thoſe lively figures with which he hath inveſted it, ſuch impaſſioned eloquence will appear equally accurate with the more ſimple and direct forms of ſpeech, but infinitely more forcible and energetic. Subjects and attributes may not be accurately diſpoſed, propoſitions formally ſtated, nor concluſions deduced with all the preciſion of the ſchools, but the eſſential principles of rational logic are not violated by the rich and noble colouring of the original *, or by the following faint imitation in our own language.

* Μὴ δὴ τοῦτο ὡς ἀδίκημα ἐμὸν θῇς, εἰ κρατῆσαι συνέβη Φιλίππῳ τὴν μάχην· ἐν γὰρ τῷ θεῷ το τοῦτο τέλος ἦν, οὐκ ἐν ἐμοί· ἀλλ' ὡς ἔχ ἅπανθα ὅσα ἐνῆν καθ' ἀνθρώπινον λογισμὸν εἰλόμεν, καὶ δικαίως ταῦτα καὶ ἐπιμελῶς ἐπραξα, καὶ φιλοπόνως ὑπὲρ δύναμιν, ἢ ὡς ἐ καλὰ καὶ τῆς πόλεως ἄξια πράγματα ενεσησάμην καὶ αναγκαῖα. ταῦτά μοι δεῖξον, καὶ τοῦ ἤδη καθηγόρει μου. εἰ δ' ὁ συμβὰς σκηπτὸς ἢ κειμὼν, μὴ μόνον ὑμῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντων μὲν ἄλλων Ελλήνων μέιζων γέγονε, τίχρὴ ποιεῖν; ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ναύκληρον παντὸ ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ πραξάντα, καὶ πᾶσι καθασκευάσαντα τὸ πλοῖον ἀφ' ὧν ὑπελάμβανε σωθήσεσθαι, εἶτα χειμῶνι χρησάμενον, καὶ πονησάντων ἀυτῷ τῶν σκευῶν, ἢ καὶ συντριβέντων ὅλως, της ναυαγίας ἀιτιῶτο. ἀλλ' ὅτε ἐκυβέρνων τὴν ναῦν, φήσειεν ἄν· ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐστραίτηγουν ἐγὼ, ὅτε τῆς τύχης κύριος ἦν, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη τῶν πάντων. Αλλ' ἐκεῖνο λογίζ καὶ ὅρα, εἰ μετὰ Θεβαίων ἡμῶν ἀγονιζομένοις, ὕτως εἰμάρτο πρᾶξαι, τι χρὴ προσδοκᾶν εἰ μηδὲ τοῦτους ἔσχομεν συμμάχους ἀλλὰ Φιλίππῳ προστέθεντο; ὑπὲρ ὅ τοῦ' ἐκεῖνος πάσας ἀφῆκε φωνάς. καὶ εἰ νῦν τριῶν ἡμερῶν ὁδὸν ἀπὸ τῆς Αττικῆς τῆς μάχης γεγενημένης τος ἦλος κίνδυνος καὶ φόβος περιέστη τὴν πόλιν, τί ἂν, εἴπε τῆς χώρας ταυτὸ τοῦτο πάθος συνέβη, προσδοκῆσαι χρῆν; ἆρ ὅιεσθε, ὅτι νῦν ἐνῆν σῶναι, συνελθεῖν, αναπεῦσαι; πολλα μία ἡμέρα καὶ δύο καὶ τρεῖς ἔδοσαν τῶν εἰς σωτηρίαν τῇ πολει. Τοῦτο δὲ ἐκ ἄξιον εἰπεῖν, ἄγε μηδὲ πεῖραν ἔδωκε θεῶν τινος εὐνοια, καὶ τὸ προβαλέσθαι τὴν πόλιν ταύτην την συμμαχίαν, ἧς σὺ κατηγορεῖς. DEMOST. περὶ Στεφ. p. 545.

" Impute

" Impute it not as my offence, that PHILIP was victorious
" in the battle. This is an event determined by God, not
" by me. Let it be proved, that I did not take every pre-
" caution, which human prudence could ſuggeſt; that I did
" not exert myſelf with integrity, with aſſiduity, with toil
" even greater than my ſtrength; that the conduct I pur-
" ſued was not noble, was not worthy of the ſtate, was not
" neceſſary. Prove this, I ſay, and then accuſe me. But if
" a ſudden clap of thunder, if a furious tempeſt burſt at
" once upon us, and laid proſtrate not our ſtate alone, but
" every ſtate in Greece; —— what then? Am I to be ac-
" cuſed? With equal juſtice might the trader, who ſends
" out his veſſel equipped and furniſhed for a voyage, be
" deemed guilty of her wreck, when ſhe had encountred a
" ſtorm ſo violent as to endamage, nay to tear away her
" tackle. He might plead thus, I was not pilot in this
" voyage —— Nor was I commander of your army, nor was
" I maſter of Fortune: ſhe it is, who commands the
" world. —— And let this be duly weighed. If, when the
" Thebans engaged on our ſide, we were yet fated to this
" calamity, what were we to expect, if they had not only
" been detached from us, but united with our enemy, in
" compliance with all his urgent ſolicitations? If, when the
" armies fought at a diſtance of three days march from
" Attica, ſuch danger and conſternation fell upon this city,
" what if the defeat had happened in our own Territory?
" Think ye that we ſhould have ſtood? that we ſhould have
" aſſembled here? that we ſhould have breathed? The
" reſpite of one day, (at leaſt of two or three) is oftentimes
" of ſignal moment towards the preſervation of a people.
" —— In the other caſe —— But I cannot bear to mention

" what

" what we muſt have ſuffered, if this ſtate had not been
" protected by the favour of ſome God, and the interpoſition
" of this alliance, the conſtant ſubject, Æſchines, of your
" clamorous malice."

But altho' it were granted, that tropical and figurative ſpeech is utterly unphiloſophical, that it is nothing but a flagrant violation of metaphyſical truth and logical accuracy, yet it ſtill remains to be proved, that *for this reaſon* it is vicious, whether by *vice* we are to underſtand immorality, or ſomething erroneous and faulty in compoſition. Aſk the moraliſt, whence it is that ſpeech is criminal. He anſwers, from it's being uſed with a ſettled purpoſe of wrongfully deceiving, or injuring, from exciting wicked paſſions or diſhoneſt thoughts, or from ſome other cauſe of the ſame nature. Aſk the critic, in what caſes tropical and figurative expreſſions are faults in compoſition. He anſwers, when they are groſs and indelicate; when they are obſcure and unnatural; puerile or frigid; or when they are diſproportioned and utterly unſuitable to the ſubject. He tells you, for inſtance, that if DEMOSTHENES really uſed ſuch Metaphors as thoſe which his adverſary objects to him*. " The State is *packed up* and *matted*;" " they *thread us like needles*, &c. he juſtly incurrs the cenſure of adopting groſs and illiberal ſimilitudes, on an occaſion which required decency and gravity: that the Roman, who called †Glaucias *Stercus Curiæ*, was indecorous and offenſive: and that nothing can be more really mean, and ridiculouſly affected and obſcure, notwithſtanding the awkward attempt at grandeur and elevation, than thoſe tropes and figures which we find aſcribed to QUERNO, in one of the Proluſions of STRADA.

* Æſchin. in Cteſiph. p. 429.

† Quinct. L. 8. C. 6.

Nox aderat tandem, & Cœlum, ex *Cyclope diurno*,
Nocturnus tunc *Argus* erat. Cum Roma feneſtris
Gaudia diſponens, velarat tecta domorum
Torque lucernarum, & *collo* ſuſpenderat alto
Verſicoloratis contexta *monilia* flammis.
Quinetiam in triviis, *Cynici verſatile tectum*,
Et *veteres Bacchi exuvias* damnaverat igni.

Neither the critic nor the moraliſt, I preſume, would object to any one form of ſpeech meerly as it was a deviation from Metaphyſical principles, tho' the manner or the occaſion of ſuch deviation might be condemned by either.

As to the charge of immorality in particular, if this be inſiſted on, let us take a general view of Eloquence in it's antient and moſt extenſive ſenſe, as comprehending not only proſaic but poetical compoſition; and ſee what there is in it's nature diſtinct from all miſapplication, which can warrant any ſuſpicion of immorality. Numbers and tuneful periods afford an innocent delight at leaſt: and that natural ſenſe of harmony, to which they are addreſſed, is the ſource of the moſt blameleſs and elegant enjoyments of human life. Our natural fondneſs for compariſon of objects, obſerving reſemblances, and forming ſimilitudes, is alſo innocent: and a philoſophical mind might perhaps diſcover ſome uſes and advantages derived from hence. But theſe are the leſs valuable parts of Eloquence. It's great and principal powers are founded on the moſt noble, moſt aimable, and virtuous qualities in our nature. They are addreſſed to our pity and ſympathy, and derive their influence from theſe lovely affections. They preſent to us exalted Characters and actions; they are addreſſed to our natural love of ſuch characters and actions; and owe their power to this affection. If they are employed to deceive, it is by operating

on

on our benevolence, our tenderneſs of affection, our virtuous indignation, our public ſpirit, or ſome other generous principle. They have their great influence on the mind in which all generous principles remain yet unperverted. And if a popular aſſembly be ſaid to be the peculiar ſphere of the Orator, perhaps a reaſon might be aſſigned not very honourable to the more exalted part of mankind: That men of an inferior rank are leſs experienced in fraud, leſs corrupted, and of conſequence leſs ſuſpicious: leſs depraved by private views of intereſt, and therefore more ſuſceptible of generous impreſſions; more attentive to the appearance of TRUTH.

But I ſhall not dwell longer on this *viciouſneſs* which is charged on tropical and figurative ſpeech: as the charge ſtands unſupported by any *argument*; and we might add, by any *authority*, if we conſider the real purport of the paſſage quoted as the *confeſſion* and *apology* of Quinctilian.

The Right Reverend Author declares, " *as* theſe [i. e. " Tropes and figures of compoſition] " are a deviation from " thoſe principles of Metaphyſics and Logic, they are fre- " quently vicious. This the great Maſter quoted above freely " confeſſeth, where ſpeaking of that ornamented ſpeech which " he calls Σχήματα Λέξεως, he makes the following confeſſion " and apology.— Eſſet enim omne ſchema VITIUM, ſi non " peteretur, ſed accideret. Verum auctoritate, vetuſtate, " conſuetudine plerumque defenditur, ſæpe etiam RATIONE " quadam. Ideoque cum ſit a ſimplici rectoque genere di- " cendi deflexa, *virtus* eſt, ſi habet probabile aliquid quod " ſequatur *."

The paſſage is taken from that chapter, in which the author profeſſes to treat of VERBAL figures [ΣΧΗΜΑΤΑ ΛΕΞΕΩΣ]; and thro' this part of his work, he ſpeaks of theſe, and no others. He divides them into two kinds, *grammatical* and *rhetorical*.

* Quinct. L. 9. C 3.

" Of the firſt ſaith he, " there are as many ſorts, as there are " grammatical faults or ſoleciſms in ſpeech. [Prius fit iiſdem " generibus quibus *vitia*] for every figure, (i. e. every ſuch " figure, or every grammatical figure) would be a *fault* in ſtyle, " if it were meerly accidental [eſſet enim omne ſchema VI- " TIUM ſi non peteretur ſed accideret.] However, the uſe of " this ſpecies is warranted by authority, by antient or preſent " uſage, and frequently by ſome reaſon.* Wherefore, as it " is a deviation from the plain and direct form of ſpeech [i. e. " the definition of a figure agrees to it, we rank it among the " ſeveral ſorts of figures, and] it is allowed as an excellence or " ornament of ſtyle, if there be ſomething plauſible to juſtify " the introducer of it."

I ſhould by no means willingly miſrepreſent the argument of my Lord Biſhop; but upon repeated examination of the paſſage here quoted, I muſt ſtate it thus.

" Quintilian declares, that what are called grammatical " figures are really no more than faulty violations of gramma- " tical rules, unleſs when purpoſedly introduced upon ſome " reaſonable or plauſible grounds."

Therefore,

" He confeſſes that Tropes and Figures of compoſition, " as they are a deviation from the Principles of Meta- " phyſics and Logic, are frequently vitious."

If this be a fair repreſentation, it were to be wiſhed that the learned Author had ſo far condeſceded to men of confined abilities, as to explain the connexion between theſe two propoſitions.

* Of which he gives this inſtance. Oculis capti Talpæ, et timidi Damæ, dicuntur a Virgilio: ſed ſubeſt RATIO *quia* ſexus uterque ab altero ſignificatur.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

HITHERTO we have conſidered Eloquence, in general, as that mode of ſpeech which ſignifies emotion or paſſion in the ſpeaker, and tends to excite them in the hearer. But it is neceſſary, as we advance in this enquiry, to be more particular: for the learned author, whoſe reaſonings we take the liberty of examining, ~~had~~ hath endeavoured to eſtabliſh his poſition on the baſis of ſtrict philoſophical argument. In order to demonſtrate that Eloquence is not eſſential to human ſpeech, but meerly arbitrary, dependent on faſhion and cuſtom, he ~~then~~ proceeds to a regular examination of it's conſtituent parts.

" ELOQUENCE is a compound of theſe three qualities of ſpeech,
" PURITY, ELEGANCE, and SUBLIMITY. Purity is the uſe of
" ſuch terms with their multiplied combinations, as the in-
" tereſt, the complexion, or the caprice of ſome writer or
" ſpeaker of authority hath preferred to it's equals. Elegance
" is ſuch a turn of idiom as a faſhionable fancy hath brought
" into repute. Sublimity is the application of ſuch images as
" arbitrary and caſual connexions, rather than their own native

" grandeur have dignified and ennobled. Since then the " conſtituent parts are arbitrary and capricious, the compound " muſt be equally nominal and unſubſtantial."

I freely confeſs that in conſidering this argument, I cannot ſo entirely diveſt myſelf of all prejudice, as is ſtrictly proper in an enquiry after truth. I cannot help feeling a ſecret hope and an inclination to believe that his Lordſhip may have been here betrayed into ſome miſtake. Particularly, as it appears from his definition of ſublimity, that the cenſure is not confined to the *Style* of Eloquence, but extends to the things ſuggeſted, the objects preſented to the mind, by ſuch a ſtyle.

Poets and Orators have been ever the admiration of mankind. They have poſſeſſed their ſeveral ſtations in the Temple of Fame, for many ages, unmoleſted: and it is ſomewhat mortifying to be now at length awakened from an agreeable dream, and to find this auguſt temple diſſolve,

Like the baſeleſs fabrick of a viſion:

to find, I ſay, whatever ages have admired as elegant or grand, ſtripped of its imaginary value, and reſolved into chance, caprice, and faſhion.——So that the Poet of the piping Winds, and the twiſted curls of flame, whom * Longinus quotes with ſo much diſreſpect, poſſeſſed as great *intrinſic* excellence, was as elegant in his diction, in his images as ſublime, as the author of the Iliad, however the fickleneſs of faſhion hath been pleaſed to conſign the very name of one to oblivion, and to caſt ſuch a blaze of glory round the other, as time hath never yet beeen able to extinguiſh.——GORGIAS, AMPHICRATES, and MATRIS, have then their appeal to the tribunal of reaſon and philoſophy, againſt the *arbitrary* determinations of mankind, in favour of the nominal and unſubſtantial merit of DEMOSTHENES. And to come nearer home.——How cruel

* Sect. 3. Ed. Pearce.

is

is the contempt which the author of the Bathos has expreſſed for poor BLACKMORE, when MILTON hath no ſuperiority but what is capricious, arbitrary and caſual? And the Commentator on POPE, who diſcovers the five kinds of ſublimity mentioned by Longinus, in the concluding verſes of the Eſſay on Man, hath done no more honour to his poet, than to inform the world, that he was fortunate in ſetting the faſhion, or nice and exact in following the faſhion; and that it is the caſual pleaſure of the world, to confer ſo great a degree of authority and reputation on his writings, while thoſe of JOSUAH SYLVESTER are as capriciouſly neglected.

Upon the firſt view of his Lordſhip's diviſion, (which, as hath been already noted, ſeems not confined to ſtyle or diction) it is obſervable that PATHOS, the very ſoul and life of eloquence is intirely omitted. If it was conſidered, as included in the laſt member of the diviſion, ſublimity, I anſwer in the words of Longinus. Ἀλλ' εἰ μέν ὡς ἕν τι ταὐτὶ ἄμφω, τὸ τε ὕψος καὶ τὸ παθητικὸν, καὶ ἔδοξεν αὐτῷς πάντη συνυπάρχειν τε ἀλλήλοις καὶ συμπεφυκέναι, διαμαρτάνει· καὶ γὰρ πάθη τινὰ διεξῶτα, ὕψους καὶ ταπεινα εὑρίσκεται, καθάπερ οἰκτοι, λυπαι, φόβοι· καὶ ἔμπαλιν ωολλαὶ ὕψη δίχα πάθους. Sect. 8.

" If the omiſſion proceeded from imagining the ſublime " and the pathetic to be one and the ſame, or that they are in- " ſeperably united and co-exiſtent; this is a miſtake. There " are paſſions not only diſtinct from ſublimity, but of a direct " contrary nature, low and depreſſed. Again, there are in- " ſtances of the ſublime without any mixture of Pathos."

PURITY of language, tho' properly belonging to the grammatical art, is indeed ranked by antient Critics among the excellences of Rhetorical compoſition. But by their confeſſion, it is the loweſt, leaſt honourable and leaſt valuable

part

part of eloquence. This is the ſentiment of the great Roman. Ipſum *latine* loqui, eſt illud quidem, ut paulo ante dixi, in magna laude ponendum, ſed non tam *ſua ſponte*, quam quod eſt a pleriſque neglectum; non enim *tam præclarum* eſt ſcire *latine*, quam turpe neſcire; neque tamen id mihi oratoris boni, quam civis Romani proprium videtur. CICER. de CLARIS ORAT. C. 37.——And again; Nemo enim unquam eſt Oratorem, quod *latine* loqueretur, admiratus. De ORAT. L. 3. C. 14.

But as purity of diction, however in itſelf of little value, is yet a part of perfect and conſummate Eloquence, let us examine whether it be truly defined as conſiſting in the "uſe of ſuch "terms with their combinations, as the intereſt, the com-"plexion, or the caprice of ſome writer or ſpeaker of *autho-*"*rity* hath preferred to its *equals*."

We are not to be informed that words, as they ſignify our Ideas, are indeed arbitrary, and that as to their primary and original value, all articulate ſounds are indeed ſtrictly *equals*. But when once they are choſen, and eſtabliſhed with their ſeveral connexions and modifications ſo as to form a language, there are then rules and principles, to which men muſt accommodate themſelves in the uſe and application of words, ſo as to convey their thoughts with clearneſs. And no ſpeaker or writer can become a ſpeaker or writer of *authority*, I mean of authority for *pure* diction, but by conforming to theſe rules. He may invent new, or revive antiquated terms, and this, either from caprice or judgment. His countrymen may adopt the innovation; which they may conſider as a proof of elegance, copiouſneſs, or ſuch like, but not of purity, unleſs ſo far as it is conformable to the analogy or etymology of his Language,

If

If we may liſten to the antient Critics, who have written on this ſubject, they tell us, that PURITY of language * conſiſts in this conformity to analogy and etymology, in an adherence to antient uſage, the practice of ſuch writers or ſpeakers, who have themſelves been thus directed, and above all to *cuſtom*, that is, as they themſelves † explain it, the general conſent of men of ſenſe and erudition.

Quem penes *arbitrium* eſt & *jus* & *norma* loquendi. HOR.

And theſe are principles of PURE diction, which, we ſee, are neither vague nor local: but, like all the other general precepts of compoſition, founded on reaſon, and applicable to all languages: in which cuſtom however deciſive, is yet not guided capriciouſly or wantonly; but in all caſes

USE will father what's begot by SENSE. POPE.

He who would write *pure* Engliſh, muſt proceed by the ſame general directions, with him who would write *pure* French. The Roman and the Greek followed the ſame rules, and preſcribed the ſame rules, to their reſpective countrymen. The writer or ſpeaker who tranſgreſſes ſuch rules, may fairly plead, that the tranſgreſſion is not ſo great as to obſcure his ſenſe; that his circumſtances made it neceſſary; or that it is mean and diſingenuous to cavil at a trifling fault, more than compenſated by the importance of his ſubject, or the ſuperior excellencies of his compoſition. But ſhould he tell us that his words are as well ſounding, and no more arbitrary, than thoſe

* Sermo conſtat ratione; vetuſtate, auctoritate, conſuetudine. Rationem præſtat præcipue analogia; nonnunquam et Etymologia. ———Conſuetudo vero certiſſima loquendi magiſtra. Quinct. L. 1. C. 4.

† Conſuetudinem ſermonis vocabo conſenſum eruditorum, ſicut vivendi, conſenſum bonorum. Ibid.

which

which we call *pure*; that both are equally indebted for their origin to chance or caprice; I fear we ſhould do no great honour to his philoſophy. Words are frequently called (and properly) the *Dreſs* of our thoughts. Suppoſe then a man were to appear publicly, in a garb partly clerical, partly laical; partly French, partly Turkiſh. If he pleaded neceſſity for this motley mixture, we ſhould accept the apology; if he diſcovered excellent qualities thro' this diſguſting appearance, we ſhould reſpect him. But if he were to tell us, that dreſs was no more than faſhion, that all faſhions were equal, and that his ſerved the purpoſes of cloathing as well as our's; what judgment ſhould we form of his mind and underſtanding?

CHAP. VII.

CHAP. VII.

IT might be obſerved, that the Right Reverend Author who paſſes ſo ſevere a cenſure on every thing in compoſition, which deviates from the principles of logic, hath himſelf been betrayed into a moſt illogical diviſion of Eloquence into it's conſtituent parts or qualities. For he hath not only enumerated them imperfectly; but, of the three qualities which he hath exhibited, the firſt is included in the ſecond, and the third is not neceſſarily and univerſally a part of Eloquence. For that a ſpeaker may be exquiſitely eloquent without ſublimity, we may be convinced by reading the ſpeech of the ſeditious ſoldier, already quoted from Tacitus.——But, without dwelling on this objection, let us proceed to conſider the ſecond member of his Lordſhip's diviſion, ELEGANCE.

This, ſaith he, " is ſuch a turn of idiom as a faſhionable " fancy hath brought into repute."-—To underſtand this definition, we muſt, in the firſt place, endeavour to diveſt it of that figurative diſguiſe which is, of all things, moſt unſuitable to a definition.——By *fancy* then, are we to underſtand a man of wild and ungoverned imagination; and, by *faſhion*, that tem-

porary favour and applauſe which are ſometimes injudiciouſly beſtowed on ſuch characters? In this caſe, the explanation of Elegance amounts only to this, that it is the effect of caprice, that it is variable and unſtable. But this is the very point to be proved. If, on the other ſide, we are to underſtand by a *faſhionable fancy*, a writer or ſpeaker of wit and ingenuity, generally approved and admired for his correct and accurate, lively, appoſite, and expreſſive turn of phraſe; then, we have Elegance thus defined, " ſuch a turn of phraſe as is ad- " mired in elegant ſpeakers or writers."——In this difficulty we muſt have recourſe to critics who have given more accurate deſcriptions of an elegant ſtyle.

They ſometimes define it, generally, to be a union of purity and clearneſs. Thus the author of the books of Rhetoric to Herennius. *Elegantia* eſt quæ facit ut unum quodque *pure* & *aperte* dici videatur. L. 4. C. 12.

Cicero deſcribes it more particularly, as conſiſting in the uſe of ſuch *proper* terms, as are not only pure and correct, but well adapted, and moſt expreſſive,——and of ſuch *metaphorical* phraſes, as exhibit a juſt and ſtriking ſimilitude,—with a due regard both to propriety and delicacy: ſo as to obſerve a proportion to the ſubject, and to betray nothing diſreſpectful or brutal. Let us hear the great Roman himſelf.

Quoniam Eloquentia conſtat ex verbis & ſententiis, perficiendum eſt, ut pure & emendate loquentes, verborum præterea & *propriorum*, & *tranſlatorum* ELEGANTIAM perſequamur. In propriis, ut *aptiſſima* eligamus; in tranſlatis, ut *ſimilitudinem* ſecuti, *verecunde* utamur alienis. De OPT. GEN. ORAT. C. 2.

In like manner, tho' with ſtill greater extent, Ariſtotle, in his treatiſe of Rhetoric (L. 3. C. 10, 11,) deſcribes TA ΑΣΤΕΙΑ & TA ΕΥΔΟΚΙΜΟΥΝΤΑ. And in ſuch deſcriptions,

deſcriptions, we may fairly aſk what can be diſcovered fantaſtical, local, or capricious? Elegance among the Greeks we find to be exactly the ſame as elegance among the Romans. And when we examine their accurate deſcriptions of this quality of ſpeech, it appears that there is good reaſon for this conformity; and that it *muſt* be invariably the ſame in all nations and languages: founded on good ſenſe, and therefore neither local nor accidental.

Or if we venture to paſs the bounds preſcribed by theſe great maſters; and include in our idea of elegance, not only the choice of phraſeology, but the graceful ſtructure and harmonious diſpoſition of period: what are the precepts by which theſe are regulated?—* That words ſhould be ſo ranged and connected, as to convey the ſentiment with eaſe and perſpicuity; relieving the voice and ear, with intervals and pauſes, duely diſpoſed and varied, ſo as to adorn and harmonize, without weakening the compoſition: that all this ſhould be conducted with a due regard to propriety, without diſcovering a minute and affected ſollicitude, or diverting the attention from the more important parts of eloquence.——In theſe again we find nothing capricious or variable. They are the maxims which have been approved and recommended by all poliſhed ages and nations. They have their foundation in truth and nature; in that love of order and harmony, that averſion to confuſion and diſſonance, which are congenial and eſſential to the human mind.

* Compoſitio——debet eſſe honeſta, jucunda, varia.——Uſus, pro natura rerum quas dicimus. Cura, magna, ut ſentiendi atque loquendi prior ſit. Diſſimulatio curæ præcipua, ut numeri ſponte fluxiſſe, non arceſſiti & coacti eſſe videantur. Quinct. L. 9. C. 4. in fine.

In like manner we might proceed to conſider decorum, propriety, or *fitneſs*, a conſtituent part or quality of Eloquence, which the Right Reverend author hath omitted: but which other writers on this ſubject, and thoſe of great authority, have treated largely.——That the language ſhould be proportioned to the ſubject, is equally reaſonable at this day, in France and Britain, as it was in Greece, when Ariſtotle wrote, or in Rome, when Quinctilian firſt inculcated the precept. It is no capricious or arbitrary direction, (nor is it a direction calculated for inabling the ſpeaker to deceive) * that his language ſhould not betray pride and ſupercilious contempt, brutal inſolence, or ſelf-conceit: that he ſhould conſider his own character, the character of his auditors or readers; that he ſhould conſider the occaſion of his addreſs, the time, the place, and other like circumſtances: and be directed in his ſtyle and compoſition by theſe conſiderations. Such principles, and indeed all the rules and principles of elocution, can abide the ſtricteſt ſcrutiny. They are received by every poliſhed nation upon earth, not implicitly, not from prejudice, not upon the authority of Greek or Roman critics; but becauſe they are the reſult of a careful and accurate obſervation of human nature, and the means by which it is moved and influenced. And as our nature, in its general frame and conſtitution, is uniform and invariable, ſo muſt be the means of operating on that frame; ſo, in general, muſt thoſe methods and forms of addreſs be found, which engage the attention, conciliate the affections, inform the underſtanding, and inflame the paſſions, ſo as to prompt and rouſe us to action, the final ſcope and object of eloquence.

* Vide Quinct. Lib. 9. C. 1. Cicero de Orat. L. 3. C. 24. Ariſt. Rhet. L. 3. C. 7.

CHAP. VIII.

CHAP. VIII.

BUT I now return to conſider the laſt and great member of his Lordſhips diviſion of Eloquence, SUBLIMITY; which he aſſerts to be nothing more than "the application of "ſuch images as arbitrary and caſual connexions; rather than "their own native grandeur, have dignified and ennobled." And here I take the liberty of obſerving, in the firſt place, that it might fairly be queſtioned, whether Sublimity doth neceſſarily conſiſt in the *application of images*, or always affect and elevate the mind by exciting images. It is a point extremely well known to critics, both ancient and modern, that the enthuſiaſm of paſſion elevates the hearer by the mere force of communication and ſympathy. Demoſthenes ſwears by the brave ſouls who fought at Marathon and Platæa. The grandeur of this figure is particularly explained by Longinus *. But no part of it is attributed to any particular image or picture impreſſed on the fancy.

* Sect. 16.

The

The concluding periods of his oration on the Crown muſt be allowed to be exceedingly ſublime. He ſeems tranſported at the mention of thoſe men whom he marks out as the enemies of his country, and at their flagitious deſigns; and he thus exclaims, with all the grandeur of a pathetic emotion.

Μὴ δῆτ' ὦ παντες Θεοὶ, μηδεὶς ταῦθ' ὑμῶν ἐπινύσειεν· ἀλλὰ μάλιστα μεν καὶ τούτοις βελτίω τινά νοῦν καὶ φρένας ἐνθείητε. Εἰδ' ἄρα ἔχουσιν οὕτως ἀνιάτως, τοῦτους μεν αὐτοὺς καθ' ἑαυτούς, ἐξωλεις καὶ προώλεις ἐν γῇ καὶ θαλάττῃ ποιήσαιτε, ἡμῖν δὲ τοῖς λοιποῖς, τὴν ταχίστην ἀπαλλαγὴν τῶς ἐπηρτημενων φόβων δοῦτε, καὶ σωτηρίαν ἀσφαλῆ.

" Hear me, ye immortal Gods! and let not theſe their de-
" ſires be ratified in heaven! Infuſe a better ſpirit into theſe
" men! Inſpire even their minds with purer ſentiments.—
" This is my firſt prayer.——Or, if their natures are not to
" be reformed; on them, on them only diſcharge your ven-
" geance! Purſue them both by land and ſea; purſue them
" even to deſtruction! But to us, diſplay your goodneſs, in a
" ſpeedy deliverance from impending evils, and all the bleſ-
" ſings of protection and tranquility!"

But the ſublimity of this concluſion ſeems not to conſiſt in the application of images, but in that noble pathos which leaves the hearer no leiſure to attend to images or their effects: but tranſports and elevates at once, by ſpreading the contagion of enthuſiaſm.

There is alſo another ſource of the ſublime in what the Greeks called To ΗΘΙΚΟΝ, where no particular images are applied to the fancy, but the ſentiment and expreſſion are therefore grand, becauſe they indicate an extraordinary dignity of character. As in the well-known * anſwer of Alexander to Parmenio. Nor are we thus affected only by greatneſs, but by

* Vid. Longin. Sect. 9.

by exalted goodneſs and benevolence of character: as in that exclamation of Saint Paul before Agrippa. "Would to God, "that not only thou, but all that hear me this day, were "both almoſt, and altogether ſuch as I am, except theſe "bonds!" Acts xxvi. 29. The effect of theſe, and many other like inſtances which might be produced, conſiſts entirely in the violent impreſſion made upon our natural ſenſe of what is great, noble, and aimable in human conduct: nor are they at all addreſſed to the imagination.

The following paſſage from the Apoſtle is alſo allowed to be highly elevated.——"All things are yours; whether Paul, "or Apollos, or Cephas, or the world, or life, or death, or "things preſent, or things to come; all are yours, and ye "are Chriſt's, and Chriſt is God's." 1 Cor. xxxi. 21.—— But if we are to credit Longinus *, the ſublimity of ſuch paſſages ariſes from the *number* of great ſentiments, and what he calls ΕΠΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΑ, the *management*, and diſpoſition of of them, the gradual aſcent, even to the very ſummit of greatneſs. And it is generally acknowledged that there may be ſublimity in the very compoſition of a period, by which the mind is affected without the help of images, or even of ſentiments; for common experience confirms the obſervation of the † great Critic, that even muſical ſounds may have a ſimilar effect.

* Sect. 11.

† Longin. Sect. 39.

CHAP. IX.

CHAP. IX.

BUT whatever may be the manner in which ſublime compoſitions act upon the mind; it is of more eſpecial moment to the preſent queſtion to conſider, whether the effect be owing to ſomething truly great, or, as the Right Reverend Author hath aſſerted, to an imaginary dignity ariſing from arbitrary and caſual connexions. And firſt of all, I ſhall take the liberty of confronting this aſſertion with a noted paſſage from Longinus, which I quote at large, as one reſpectable authority in direct oppoſition to another.

* " You are to know then," ſaith that elegant Critic, addreſſing himſelf to his friend, " that, as in common life, thoſe " things never can be great, which it is greatneſs to deſpiſe; " as

* Εἰδέναι χρὴ, φίλτατε, διότι, καθάπερ κἀν τῷ κοινῷ βίῳ οὐδὲν ὑπάρχει μέγα, ἃ τὸ καταφρονεῖν ἐστι μέγα· οἷον πλοῦτοι, τιμαὶ, δοξαι, τυραννίδες, καὶ ὅσα δὴ ἄλλα ἔχει πολὺ τὸ ἔξωθεν προσραγῳδούμενον, ἐκ ἂν τῷ γε φρονίμῳ δόξειεν ἀγαθὰ ὑπερβαλλοντα, ὧν αὐτὸ τὸ περιφρονεῖν ἀγαθὸν ὑμέτριον· θαυμάζουσι γὰρ τῶν ἐχόντων αὐτὰ μᾶλλον τὸς δυναμένους ἔχειν, καὶ διὰ μεγαλοψυχίαν ὑπερορῶντας· Τῇ δέ που καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ διηρμένων ἐν ποιήμασι καὶ λόγοις ἐπισκεπτέον, μή τινα μεγέθους φαντασίαν ἔχοι τε ταὐτην,

" as riches, honours, fame, power, and all thoſe acquiſitions
" which are ſurrounded with a vaſt external pomp, but can
" have no intrinſic excellence in the eyes of men of ſenſe, who
" know that it is rather an excellence to deſpiſe them; and
" that the poſſeſſors are by no means ſo juſtly the objects of
" admiration, as thoſe who might acquire them, but have
" ſuch dignity of ſoul, as to look down upon them with in-
" difference.——So are we to judge, of grandeur in poetry
" and eloquence, and whether there may not here be found a
" certain outward ſhew of greatneſs, ſupported by a profuſion
" of falſe and injudicious ornament, but ſuch, as when ac-
" curately examined, proves devoid of ſolidity, and what it is
" much more noble to contemn than to admire.——It is
" from NATURE that the ſoul is in ſome ſort elevated by the
" true ſublime, that it feels the generous tranſport, and
" ſwells with delight and exultation, as if, what is heard,
" had been a conception of it's own. But when the ſame
" thing, frequently repeated to a man of ſenſe, and one conver-
" ſant in works of genius, doth not raiſe his mind to generous
" ſentiments, doth not leave it filled with ſomething greater

ταὐτην, (ᾗ πολὺ πρόσκειται τὸ εἰκῆ προσαναπλατ[illegible]όμενον), ἀναπλυσόμενα δὲ ἄλλως εὑρίσκοιτο καῦνα, ὧν τὲ θαυμὰζειν τὸ περιφρονεῖν εὐγενέστερον· Φύσει γάρ πως ὑπὸ τἀληθῶς ὕψους ἐπαιρεταί τε ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ, καὶ γαῦρόν τι ἀνάθημα λαμβάνουσα πληρῶται χαρᾶς καὶ μεγαλαυχίας, ὡς αὐτὴ γεννήσασα ὅπερ ἤκουσεν. Ὅταν ἓν ὑπ' ἀνδρὸς ἔμφρονος καὶ ἐμπείρου λόγων πολλάκις ἀκουόμενόν τι πρὸς μεγαλοφροσύνην τὴν ψυχὴν μὴ συνδιατιθῇ μηδ' ἐγκαταλείπῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ πλεῖον τὲ λεγομένου τὸ ἀναθεωρόμενον, πίπλῃ δ, ἂν τὸ συνεχές ἐπισκοπῇς, εἰς ἀπαύξησιν· οὐκ ἂν ἔτ' ἀληθὲς ὕψος εἴη, μέχρι μόνης τῆς ἀκοῆς σωζόμενον. Τοῦτο γὰρ τῷ ὄντι μέγα, ὃ πολλὴ μεν ἡ ἀναθεώρησις, δύσκολος δὲ, μᾶλλον δ' ἀδύνατος ἡ κατεξανάστασις· ἰσχυρὰ δὲ ἡ μνήμη, καὶ δυσεξάλειπτος. Ὅλως δὲ καλὰ νόμιζε ὕψη καὶ ἀληθινὰ, τὰ διαπαντὸς ἀρέσκοντα καὶ πᾶσιν· ὅταν γὰρ τοῖς ἀπὸ διαφόρων ἐπιτηδευμάτων, βίων, ζήλων, ἡλικιῶν, λόγων ἕν τι καὶ ταυτὸν ἅμα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἅπασι δοκῇ, τόθ' ἡ ἐξ ἀσυμφώνων ὡς κρίσις καὶ συγκατάθεσις τὴν ἐπὶ τῷ θαυμαζομένῳ πίστιν ἰσχυρὰν λαμβάνει καὶ ἀναμφίλεκτον. Long. S. 7. Ed. Pearce.

" than the import of the bare expreſſion, but ſinks on re-
" peated examination, and leſſens into meanneſs; ſuch, we
" may be aſſured, can never be the true ſublime, whoſe ef-
" fects remain no longer than the words are pronounced. But
" the characters of real and genuine ſublimity are theſe. It
" fills the mind with vaſt conceptions; it is difficult, nay im-
" poſſible to bear up againſt the force of its impreſſion; and
" the remembrance of it is ſtrong, ſcarcely ever to be effaced.
" In a word, you are to eſteem that really beautiful and
" ſublime, which approves itſelf to *all times* and *all perſons*.
" For when *men* of ſuch *various occupations*, *ages*, *manners*,
" *and purſuits*, *unite* in one and the ſame judgment upon any
" performance, this harmonious combination of opinions
" forms the real and indiſputable criterion of what is truly
" marvellous and ſublime."

We find then, that whatever is local or accidental, whatever is *dignified and ennobled* by *arbitrary* or *caſual* connexions, is not that ſublime of which the Critic ſpeaks; is not that wonderful and affecting quality, which the man of judgment and experience in works of genius, [ΑΝΗΡ ΕΜΦΡΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΕΜΠΕΙΡΟΣ ΛΟΓΩΝ] pronounces truly grand and tranſporting. He diſtinguiſhes between external pomp, and intrinſic greatneſs; between the momentary impreſſion, and that which is permanent and indelible, which reaſon and reflection confirm and enforce; which ſtands the ſhock of time; prevails over all accidental changes of manners; nor is impaired by the alteration of language; but however, and whenever it is propoſed to thoſe who are qualified for judging, muſt always be approved and admired.

CHAP. X.

CHAP. X.

BUT not to reſt ſolely upon authority however venerable, let us now proceed to conſider, whether this opinion of the *local* and *caſual* nature of ſublimity can abide the teſt of reaſon.

It can ſcarcely be controverted, I preſume, that ſome ſubjects are in themſelves intrinſically and eſſentially greater and more elevated than others: and that whenever they are propoſed to the mind, they muſt be received with ſuperior emotion, reverence, awe, or terror, naturally and inſtinctively, or at leaſt independant of any caſual aſſociation of ideas. We call the ocean a grander object than a rivulet, becauſe it ſtrikes the ſenſes and imagination more forcibly. The ſerious actions and engagements of human life, are really greater objects than it's amuſements. A battle is ſtill a more aweful ſubject than any of the calmer occupations of ſocial life. And the works and diſpenſations of the Deity, ſtill more auguſt and aweful than the moſt ſtriking actions of the Creature.

There is alſo an eſſential difference between the ſentiments and conceptions of different men, when employed on grand ſubjects, according to their different degrees of judgment, knowledge, refinement, livelineſs of fancy, and ſuch like. He who conceived that the end of conqueſt was to eat and drink, thought but meanly upon a magnificent ſubject. The ſentiment of Parmenio, on the ſame ſubject, was more exalted: that of Alexander, greater ſtill, yet perhaps, without riſing to the utmoſt pitch of true dignity, or being entirely diveſted of ΤΟ ΕΧΩΘΕΝ ΠΡΟΣΤΡΑΓΩΔΟΥΜΕΝΟΝ.

There is no grander and more aweful ſubject, on which a writer or ſpeaker can be employed, than that of the Deity executing his juſtice publicly and ſenſibly, upon his offending creatures. Let it then be conſidered, whether there be not a real and intrinſic difference, as to the dignity of ſentiment and conception, between two different writers, furniſhed with the ſame grandeur of ſubject.——In one part of the Alcoran, Mahomet relates how the Lord defeated the Ethiopians, who came mounted on elephants to deſtroy the temple of Mecca, by ſending birds againſt them, which threw down ſtones upon their heads. We are told, that each of theſe birds carried three ſtones, one in the mouth, and the other two in the feet: that theſe ſtones, tho' not much larger than peaſe, were yet of ſuch weight that they pierced the ſoldiers thro' their armour, and that on each of them was written the name of him who was to be ſlain by it.

I preſume, we can make no ſcruple to declare, that the ſentiments here expreſſed, of the agency and inſtruments of the Deity, are not ſufficiently exalted for the ſubject; but rather mean and minute, and devoid of real dignity. At leaſt we may appeal to the feelings of any man in any nation, not

not intirely ſavage, and brutally ignorant, whether the following ſhort account of the ſacred hiſtorian, be not infinitely more affecting and elevating.

" And it came to paſs that night, that the ANGEL OF THE " LORD went out and *ſmote* in the camp of the Aſſyrians an " hundred fourſcore and five thouſand; and when they aroſe " early in the morning, *behold! they were all dead corpſes!*". 2 Kings, 19. 35.

In the account of Mahomet's journey into heaven, we meet with ſcarcely any circumſtance, that is not diſguſting by it's meanneſs and puerility.—His beaſt ſo vicious, that nothing but a promiſe of a place in paradiſe could prevail on him to ſuffer the prophet to mount him.—His angels in the ſhape of birds and beaſts.—His cock as white as ſnow, with his feet on the firſt heaven, and his head riſing to the diſtance of five hundred years journey; crowing ſo loud, that all hear it that are in heaven and earth, except men and fairies.——Surely there is an intrinſic difference in point of ſublime ſentiment, between this motley mixture of the great and the ridiculous,*

* Here it may be obſerved, that if a juſt dignity and elevation of ſentiment be the firſt and moſt valuable part of ſublime compoſition, and if ſublimity be ſo eſſential an ingredient of Eloquence, it follows, that the Alcoran, in which are found ſuch coldneſs, meanneſs, and puerility of ſentiment, upon the nobleſt ſubjects, cannot merit that exalted character which my Lord Biſhop of Glouceſter hath been pleaſed to beſtow upon it, cannot be *as real and ſubſtantial a pattern of eloquence, as any whatever*; much leſs, can it acquire this character, in the way which his Lordſhip hath pointed out, from the prejudices and opinions of thoſe who are ſaid to regulate their notions of what is grand and elegant, by this very compoſition. To them it may be a pattern of eloquence: that is, they know no better pattern. But even in them it would be raſhneſs to conclude that there is therefore really no better: (what is attempted to be proved with reſpect to ſublimity, being equally applicable to Eloquence in general.)

and

and that noble and aweful obſcurity with which the Apoſtle ſpeaks on the ſame ſubject.

" I knew a man in Chriſt, about fourteen years ago, whe-
" ther in the body, I cannot tell, or whether out of the body,
" I cannot tell: God knoweth: Such a one *caught up* to the
" third heaven. And I knew ſuch a man, whether in the
" body, or out of the body, I cannot tell; God knoweth;
" how that he was caught up into Paradiſe, and heard *un-*
" *ſpeakable* words, *which is not lawful for a man to utter.*"
1 Cor. xii. 2, 3, 4.

It ſhould ſeem then, that we are warranted to proceed one ſtep farther, and to affirm, that *proper expreſſions* of theſe more exalted ſentiments, and images more truely ennobled, muſt form a compoſition of real and intrinſic ſuperiority in point of grandeur; and that an Arabian muſt acknowledge this, if ſuch ſentiments or images were once conveyed to his mind by the purity and elegance of his Alcoran.—— — " No: for
" he has already formed his idea of ſublimity; and muſt
" judge of every new object by the ſtandard to which he has
" been accuſtomed."——If this be truth and nature, it muſt hold in all poſſible caſes and inſtances which can be deviſed.

Let us then ſuppoſe the Mantuan Shepherd, who had conceived that Rome was no more than a vaſt collection of cottages, entertaining his fellow ſwains with an eloquent or poetical deſcription of this city, according to his and their confined ideas. He deſcribes the vaſt number of it's ſhepherd-inhabitants, and the extenſive range of their dwellings, the crowds of Galateas and Amaryllis's, all cloathed in the beſt and fineſt weeds that his village had ever ſeen, the number of flocks and herds, and all the circumſtances of rural magnificence. His hearers are delighted and ſurprized by this deſcription

cription, which they call grand; and, in ſpeaking on the ſame ſubject, they borrow the ſentiments and expreſſions of their favourite orator or bard. But is this habit of thinking and ſpeaking never to be altered? or can ſuch habit make the harangue of this ſhepherd as truely ſublime as any whatever? Suppoſe an Orator, more refined and better informed, could repreſent to the minds of theſe villagers, the richneſs, the luſtre, the gorgeous palaces, the ſtupendous temples of this great Capital of the world;

Statues, and Trophies, and triumphal Arcs;

* * *

——————The Capitol ——
Above the reſt, lifting his ſtately head,
On the Tarpeian Rock :——————

* *

Th' imperial Palace, compaſs huge, and high
The ſtructure, ſkill of nobleſt Architects,
With gilded battlements, conſpicuous far;
Turrets and Terraſſes, and glitt'ring Spires.

As alſo, the

——————Conflux iſſuing forth, or ent'ring in;
Prætors, Proconſuls to their provinces
Haſt'ning, or on return, in Robes of ſtate;
Lictors and rods, the enſigns of their pow'r;
Legions, and Cohorts, turms of horſe, and wings;

PARAD. REG.

In a word, all the pomp and glory of the city and it's inhabitants, in a manner ſuitable to the ſubject: or (if words could not as yet convey theſe grand ideas to their minds) ſhould he firſt lead them to this magnificent city, and then renew the impreſſion of thoſe auguſt ſcenes which they had viſited, by his

his lively and animated deſcription, could they ſtill perſevere in thinking and pronouncing, that ſuch deſcription was not really more ſublime than that of the ruſtic ? Or could the moſt rigid philoſophical ſpirit venture to affirm that the one had no ſuperiority over the other, but what was arbitrary and caſual, what was derived from chance or caprice ?—The ideas of the one, are, clearly, more ſtriking and affecting than thoſe of the other. And the modes of ſpeech which convey thoſe more ſtriking ideas in their full force, and deſcribe their full impreſſion upon the fancy or the paſſions, muſt have the ſame real and intrinſic ſuperiority ; for they have the greater power in raiſing tranſport and ſurprize ; and what is called ſublimity of compoſition is nothing more than this power of tranſporting and ſurprizing.

If then different men form different opinions of ſublimity in compoſition, ſo do they form different opinions of the magnitude and dimenſions of external bodies, upon confined and imperfect views ; and yet the nature of quantity is not for that reaſon vague and capricious : So do they form various opinions of virtue and vice ; and yet the nature of virtue and vice is not caſual and arbitrary. The improvement of reaſon and reflection, the enlargement of obſervation and experience, have the ſame effect in correcting their prejudices, and ennobling their ſentiments, both in Morals and in Literature.—An Aſiatic is born in a country of depotiſm. He has from his infancy been taught, that the ſum of his duty is to pay an unlimited obedience to his Maſter. His ſentiments are thoſe of abject ſlavery ; and they are expreſſed in all the pomp of flattery and ſubmiſſion. Theſe ſentiments he calls heroic, and theſe expreſſions ſublime and elevated. But let him be once inſtructed in the rights of man, in the duties of ſocial life, in the laws

of

of juſtice and benevolence; let him be a witneſs of the noble effects of civil liberty; and his ſentiments and language ſhall be totally changed. He ſhall now look on with cold indifference, if not with pity and contempt, while

——————The gorgeous Eaſt with richeſt hand
Show'rs on her Kings barbaric pearl and gold. MILT.

And when he beholds the mighty monarch receiving the adoration of ten thouſand proſtrate vaſſals, he ſhall turn away with ſcorn and indignation; he ſhall regard LEONIDAS at the head of his little band of Spartans, as an object more truly admirable, grand and magnificent: and his ſtyle muſt now become more *ſublime*, as it is the effuſion of nobler ſentiments and more generous paſſions.—So that what the poet obſerves of good writing in general, is peculiarly applicable to ſublime compoſition.

——————SAPERE, eſt principium & fons. HOR.

CHAP. XI.

BUT it is obſerved ſtill farther, that there is alſo a diverſity of opinion with reſpect to what is called *ſublime* in compoſition, even among men of extenſive knowledge and refinement: that "this ſpecies of Eloquence changed it's na-"ture, with the change of clime and language; and the ſame "expreſſion, which in one place had the utmoſt *ſimplicity*, "had in another, the utmoſt *ſublime* †."——Here one might be tempted to anſwer that this might well be; and even in the ſame place. For it is a point known to every ſmatterer in Criticiſm, that theſe two qualities are ſo far from being inconſiſtent with each other, that they are frequently united by a natural and inſeparable union. But as men of deep and extenſive learning, when they deſcend to treat of thoſe inferior matters of taſte and compoſition, do not confine themſelves to the maxims and modes of ſpeech uſed by meer critics and rhetoricians, it would ſeem diſreſpectful, not to be more diſtinct and explicit upon this point.

† Doct. of Grace. B. 1. C. 9. p. 53.

That

That a grand and pompous diction is the direct contrary to a *ſimple* ſtyle, cannot be denied: but grand and pompous diction is not neceſſarily the ſame with true dignity and ſublimity of compoſition. It may be employed on a mean occaſion; and then, inſtead of elevating the ſubject, it ſets the meanneſs of it in the ſtrongeſt light, ſo as to excite ridicule. It may be employed upon a ſubject, tho' not quite ridiculous, yet diſproportioned to ſuch a ſtyle; and then it excites contempt and diſguſt: or it may be uſed on more exalted ſubjects, but ſuch as may not at once ſtrike the imagination with their full force, but require ſome effort or artifice, to engage his attention, and to impreſs them upon his mind; but even here, the effect may be defeated, if this effort, or this artifice be apparent; and if it does not ſeem the natural reſult of real feeling and ſenſibility. Again, when employed on ſubjects of greateſt dignity, and to convey ſentiments of themſelves highly elevated and affecting; it diſſipates the mind and attention of the hearer, which ſhould be concentered in one important point. It betrays an unworthy attention in the ſpeaker to the inferior excellencies of ſtyle; when he had an object which ſhould totally poſſeſs him, and leave him no leiſure for any artificial ſelection or arrangement of his phraſes. It ſhews that he is not himſelf ſincerely affected with the noble emotion, when he has recourſe to artifice and ornament; and therefore he cannot propagate it. Hence a ſimplicity of ſtyle, that is, ſuch an energetic mode of expreſſion as conveys the thought compleatly, without appearance of art, labour or affectation, is the true and proper garb of ſublime ſentiments. And hence, in all works of genius, ſimplicity aud ſublimity are ſo far from being conſidered as two oppoſite qualities, that no terms are more frequent and familiar, than thoſe of a *noble ſimplicity*, and a *natural*, unaffected, *ſimple grandeur*.

But when it is aſſerted that ſimple modes of ſpeech are oftentimes moſt truely ennobled and ſublime, no more is meant than this, that they are beſt fitted to convey ſublime conceptions, and to give them their full impreſſion upon the mind. And this is an inconteſtable truth, however we may ſometimes be perplexed with diſtinctions, between Sublimity of *Subject*, or Sentiment, and Sublimity of *Style*. HUET, biſhop of *Avranches*, cenſured Longinus for quoting the famous paſſage of Geneſis [AND GOD SAID LET THERE BE LIGHT: AND THERE WAS LIGHT] as an example of true Sublimity *. "It is true," ſaith he, "Moſes relates a matter which is grand, "but expreſſes it in a manner by no means grand." Boileau ſupported the opinion of his favourite author: the Biſhop, with his learned co-adjutor M. Le Clerc, replied with ſharpneſs; which was again retorted by the Satyriſt.

The learned Biſhop of Glouceſter, when he comes to account for this difference of opinion, far from recurring to any minute verbal diſtinctions, juſtly and ingenuouſly conſiders the ideas ſuggeſted by any mode of expreſſion, and the ſenſations excited in the mind, in order to determine whether ſuch expreſſion be ſublime or no. He obſerves † that nothing but the ſimplicity of the controverted paſſage could be ſeen or felt by a Jewiſh reader, to whom the ideas ariſing from the knowledge of the true God and his attributes were familiar; and whenever ideas are familiar, they raiſe no emotion: but that the mind of a Greek muſt have been warmed and enlarged by the ſame paſſage; as it conveys ideas of Theology to him

† Doct. of Grace. B. 1. l. 9. p. 54 & 55.

* Il eſt vrai que Moïſe rapporte une Choſe qui eſt grande: mais il exprime d'une façon qui ne l'eſt nullement. Oeuvres de Boileau, Vol. 2. Fol. Edit. Amſt.

novel

novel and unfamiliar: and of conſequence he would naturally eſteem it to be infinitely ſublime.——But not to mention that ideas, rendered familiar to the mind, may yet raiſe emotion; that altho' falſe pomp and outward greatneſs loſe their effect by familiarity, yet real and intrinſic grandeur (as the Greek critic obſerves in the paſſage above quoted) ſupports it's dignity even after repeated examination; and the more accurate and exact, the more refined and enlarged the ſentiments of the hearer may be, the more he is affected and tranſported by the inſtances of ſuch grandeur;———Not to inſiſt on this, I ſay; may it not be queſtioned, without preſumption, whether his Lordſhip hath not left the controverſy yet undecided? For it ſtill remains to be explained, how and whence it is, that many Chriſtian readers, as well as the Poet Boileau, are affected by this paſſage with grand emotions, altho' the *ideas ariſing from the Knowledge of God and his attributes, be familiar* to them, and altho' they can *raiſe themſelves* with *as little pain* as any ordinary Jew whatever,

To the firſt good, firſt perfect, and firſt fair.

A late writer of leſs eminence than my Lord Biſhop, hath propoſed a different deciſion of this noted controverſy. I quote his obſervation at large, not from an opinion of it's intrinſic value, but as an inſtance (for ſuch I conceive it to be) of the great danger of refining in Criticiſm.

——" In deſcribing ſuperior beings," ſaith the author of a Book called *Elements of Criticiſm* *, " the reader's imagination, " unable to ſupport itſelf in a ſtrained elevation, falls often " as from an height, and ſinks even below it's ordinary tone. " The following inſtance comes luckily in view, for a better " illuſtration cannot be given; *God ſaid, let there be light, and there*

* V. 1. C. 4.

" *there was light*. Longinus cites this paſſage from Moſes,
" as a ſhining example of the ſublime; and it is ſcarce poſ-
" ſible, in fewer words, to convey ſo clear an image of the
" infinite power of the Deity. But then it belongs to the
" preſent ſubject to remark, that the emotion of ſublimity
" raiſed by this image is but momentary; and that the mind,
" unable to ſupport itſelf in an elevation ſo much above na-
" ture, immediately ſinks down into humility and veneration,
" for a being ſo far exalted above us groveling mortals. Every
" one is acquainted with a diſpute about this paſſage betwixt
" two French Critics, the one poſitively affirming, the other
" as poſitively denying it to be ſublime. What I have
" opened, ſhews that both of them have reached the truth,
" but neither of them the whole truth. Every one of taſte
" muſt be ſenſible, that the primary effect of this paſſage is an
" emotion of grandeur. This ſo far juſtifies Boileau. But
" then every one of taſte muſt be equally ſenſible, that the
" emotion is merely a flaſh, which vaniſheth inſtantly, and
" gives way to the deepeſt humility and veneration. This
" indirect effect of Sublimity juſtifies Huet on the other hand,
" who, being a man of true piety, and perhaps of inferior
" imagination, felt the humbling paſſions more ſenſibly than
" his antagoniſt. And even laying aſide any peculiarity of
" character, Huet's opinion may, I think, be defended as
" the more ſolid; upon the following account, that in ſuch
" images, the depreſſing emotions are the more ſenſibly felt,
" and have the longer endurance."

This, I muſt confeſs, ſeems ſuch a juſtification of the Biſhop of Avranches, as he himſelf, I preſume, never would have ſubſcribed to.——Awe and veneration ariſe, from a

ſenſe

ſenſe of power, and greatneſs, and dignity. He felt this awe and veneration, from the expreſſion of God's omnipotence above quoted, more forcibly than Boileau. And therefore he could not feel their efficient cauſes ſo forcibly, or rather, he did not feel them at all. In other words, the paſſage before us was ſo tranſporting, ſo noble an expreſſion of almighty power, that it at once determined the Biſhop to adore that power in all piety and humility.—And therefore, to him, it had nothing noble or tranſporting.——The queſtion is entirely about the immediate impreſſions made by any object or deſcription, not the actions, paſſions, or affections, ariſing from ſuch impreſſions. Theſe, how quickly ſoever they may ariſe, are not excited without their proper cauſe; and their exiſtence proves the exiſtence of that cauſe. And the more powerfully the conſequent affections are excited, the more forcibly the firſt impreſſions muſt have operated.——A man finds a vaſt hidden treaſure: he is ſeized with a ſudden joy, which is too violent for his frame, and he faints away. But this depreſſion ſurely proves not only that he felt this paſſion of joy, but that he felt it in exceſs. He is proud of his acquiſition, and careful to depoſite it in a place of ſecurity. But this pride, and this caution, ſeem but a bad proof that he firſt received the acquiſition with little more than indifference, and was ſcarcely conſcious of it's value.——But, inſtead of dwelling on this pretended ſolution, it may poſſibly be of ſome uſe in throwing light upon the preſent ſubject, to liſten for a while to the contending parties themſelves.

The Biſhop of Avranches inſiſts that the paſſage in diſpute owes it's grandeur intirely to the dignity of the ſubject *, which

* Qui ſe fait aſſez ſentir étant rapportée nuement, ſans avoir beſoin d'être relevée par des ornemens recherchez. Oeuvres de Boileau. V. 2. p. 136.

ſupports

ſupports itſelf without the aid of ornament: That they who contend that the ſentence in queſtion is ſublime, make the ſacred hiſtorian tranſgreſs the well-known rule, that the beginnings of the grandeſt compoſitions ſhould be ſimple *: That if a man, in relating a ſurprizing event, ſhould, in the midſt of it, all at once apoſtrophize to the principal actor; ſuch an apoſtrophe would paſs for an inſtance of extravagance: and yet ſuch is the extravagance imputed to Moſes, by thoſe who maintain that he has raiſed his ſtyle above the ordinary pitch of language, in relating the creation of light †: That the mode of expreſſion which he uſes on this occaſion was common and familiar to the Jews: That it is impious to ſuppoſe that *human* weakneſs can deſcribe the *divine* operations ſublimely: and that it is diſhonourable to the ſacred hiſtorian to declare, that he had recourſe to the falſe colouring of the ſchools; to degrade him into a baſe Rhetorician, and to aſſert that he employed uſeleſs figures, and diſguiſed a ſubject ſo noble in itſelf by ſuperfluous ornaments ‡.

* Ibid. p. 140.

† P. 138.

‡ P. 150.

Boileau, on the other hand, contends ||, that, beſides the dignity of ſubject, there is alſo a grandeur and elevation of ſentiment in this paſſage, together with a choice and turn of phraſe, beſt fitted to convey that grandeur both of ſentiment and ſubject, in ſuch a manner as to impreſs the mind with the moſt lively and exalted emotion: That, in this conſiſts the ſublimity, not in pompous words, or *ambitioſa ornamenta*: That, neither did Longinus inſinuate, nor did he himſelf aſſert, that, in the diſputed paſſage, there was any thing of what is called a grand ſtyle; but that *extraordinary*, that *marvellous* which are ſometimes found in the moſt ſimple forms of

|| Vide Reflexion X. ſur quelques paſſages de Longin ou Refutation; &c.

ſpeech;

ſpeech; and where that very ſimplicity often conſtitutes the ſublimity: That the ſacred hiſtorian has not then tranſgreſſed the rules of compoſition, as the beginning of his work, tho' a juſt and grand deſcription of a noble ſubject, is yet ſimple and unaffected: That the form of ſpeech may have been common and familiar to the Jews; but it is not only the form of ſpeech which critics are to conſider, but the manner, and occaſion, and application, as the meanneſs or greatneſs of the compoſition depends on theſe: and the ſame form may be unaffecting, or low, trivial, and puerile, when uſed to deſcribe an ordinary or trivial action, which, on a more ennobled occaſion, may be grand and ſtriking *. And, as to the argument from the ineffable grandeur of the deity and his operations, he reminds his antagoniſts, that *Sublimity* is a relative term; and that all critics ſpeak of it with reſpect to human conceptions and underſtandings.

* Qui eſt-ce en effet qui peut nier qu'ne choſe dite en un endroit parroîtra baſſe & petite; & que la même choſe dite en un autre endroit deviendra grande, noble, ſublime, & plus que ſublime? Qu'un homme, par example, qui montre a danſer, diſe à un jeune garçon qu'il inſtruit, *Allez par là, revenez, détournez, arrêtez:* cela eſt très-puérile, & paroît même ridicule á raconter. Mais que le Soleil, voyant ſon fils Phaëton qui s'égare dans les Cieux ſur un char qu'il a eu la folle témérité de vouloir conduire, crie de loin à ce fils, a peu près les mêmes, ou de ſemblables paroles, cela devient très-noble, & très-ſublime, comme on peut le reconnoitre dans ces vers d'Euripide rapportés par Longin.

Le pere cependant plein d'un trouble funeſte,
Le voit rouler de loin ſur la plaine celeſte;
Lui montre encore ſa route, & du plus haut de Cieux,
Le ſuit autant qu'il peut de la voix, & des yeux.
Va par-là, lui dit il. Reviens. Détourne. Arrête. *Ibid.*

This general view of the controverſy may be ſufficient to ſhew, that we are not from thence warranted to conclude, that the ſame compoſition may, or may not, be ſublime, juſt as accidental connexions have, or have not ennobled the ideas or images which it raiſes; for the true ground of diſpute, we find, is no more than the different ſenſes affixed by the contending parties to the term *Sublimity*. Huet very juſtly contends that any Rhetorical artifice was unworthy of the ſacred hiſtorian. Boileau, with equal juſtneſs, ſhews, that ſuch artifice muſt have weakened and deſtroyed his ſublimity. The one proves that his language is plain and unaffected; the other, that ſuch plain and unaffected language is beſt ſuited to his ſubject: the one, that he has no falſe pomp; the other, that he has the greateſt native dignity. Huet and Le Clerc, however ſuperior to Boileau in point of biblical learning, were leſs attentive to the true meaning of Longinus.

Not but that men of erudition may differ from each other in point of real feeling, and ſentiment, on ſome particular inſtances of compoſition. The paſſions and imagination have not exactly the ſame force in every individual, nor are they equally ſuſceptible of emotion. He who hath been long habituated to a calm examination of the metaphyſical nature of things, hath ſenſations quite different from his, who hath been ever converſant in works of genius, the fine arts, and the pleaſures of the imagination. The enthuſiaſtic emotion which the latter indulges with ſuch delight, ſeldoms warms his breaſt. He poſſibly regards it as dangerous and extravagant. Even among thoſe who are moſt converſant in works of imagination, there is the ſame variety of Taſte and degrees of Senſibility:

Senſibility: and, of conſequence, there muſt be a difference of Sentiment upon ſubjects of taſte and feeling.

Some may find it reputable to have a ſenſe of what is excellent in compoſition, and may affect to diſcover grandeur, where the moſt diſtinguiſhing real taſte cannot perceive it. Others will acknowledge themſelves unaffected, but impute a coldneſs, which really proceeds from a want of ſenſibility, to the correctneſs of their judgment. Some, from cuſtom or temper, acquire a partiality for one particular ſpecies of compoſition, and are indifferent to others of equal or greater value. They have been accuſtomed, for inſtance, to delight in neatneſs, fluent eaſe, and elegance; and attend with reluctance to thoſe objects which are not diſtinguiſhed by their favourite qualities, and, of conſequence, are leſs affected by them. Other men acquire a fondneſs for whatever is ridiculous and burleſque, and may be indifferent to ſuch performances as do not gratify their mirth or their malignity. But in theſe and all ſuch caſes, the real grandeur of compoſition is by no means altered. Juſt as in the external ſenſes, the taſte, the hearing, the ſight may be vitiated or impaired, or loſt. But the qualities fitted to affect them, cannot be loſt or changed, but with the nature and properties of bodies. The eye may be long habituated to minute objects, and may deem thoſe *great* which exceeds them but a little: or, upon a general ſurvey of the works of nature, may dwell with moſt pleaſure on thoſe to which it hath been moſt accuſtomed. Philoſophy may proceed to the important diſcovery, that nothing is great or ſmall, but by compariſon. But this diſcovery doth not at all affect the differences of magnitude or quantity. The Mathematician

ſtill proceeds to meaſure and determine theſe. In the caſe of metaphorical greatneſs, indeed, or the ſublimity of compoſition, there are not ſuch accurate methods of aſcertaining every preciſe degree of exceſs or difference. Yet there are ſtriking differences and diſtinctions at once perceptible, ſo as to warrant an appeal againſt the moſt poſitive deciſions of faſhion, cuſtom, or prejudice, and to eſtabliſh general principles of RATIONAL CRITICISM.

CHAP. XIII.

CHAP. XIII.

IF then PURITY and ELEGANCE of compoſition have their ſettled rules and principles, by which all ages and nations have been, and muſt be invariably directed; if SUBLIMITY be not capricious, vague, and caſual, either in the form of expreſſion, or in the images, ſentiments, or affections conveyed to the mind; and if all the ſeveral conſtituent qualities of Eloquence have a real and intrinſic value independent on faſhion or cuſtom: in a word, if not only *ſome* but *all* the ſubſtantial principles of Eloquence are common to all languages; it ſeems to follow, that the compound of theſe qualities, the forms of ſpeech framed and directed by theſe principles, cannot be variable, capricious, or fantaſtical; nor can all the various modes of elocution, which have ever prevailed, be ſo intirely indifferent, that reaſon can give no preference; or ſo exactly equal in point of real value, that any one may be as good and perfect a model as any other whatſoever.

Different

Different degrees of underſtanding and judgment, different paſſions, habits, tempers, and occupations, muſt of neceſſity prevail among men, and muſt produce different forms and manners of elocution. The value of theſe, that is, their influence and perſuaſive power, or (which is the ſame thing) their difference with reſpect to eloquence, depends on the information which they convey, and the clearneſs and ſtrength with which it is enforced, the characters and moral qualities which they diſplay, and the paſſions which they tend to excite: this difference then can be no more nominal or local, than the diſtinction between theſe mental and intellectual qualities.

An ingenious writer, who, in treating this ſubject, ſometimes concurs in Sentiment with the Biſhop of G, aſcribes the various modes of elocution, which have prevailed in different countries, to another cauſe; the *arbitrary* nature of words as ſigns of our ideas. "Language," ſaith Doctor BROWNE, "being the voluntary application of *arbitrary* ſigns, accord-"ing to the conſent of different men and nations, there is no "*ſingle uniform model of nature* to be followed. HENCE, "*Gracefulneſs* or *Strength* of Style, Harmony or *Softneſs*, *co-*"*pious* expreſſion, *terſe* brevity, or *contraſted* periods, have by "turns gained the approbation of particular countries *."—— Had then mankind formed their ſpeech by one univerſal model, and the ſame ideas were every where invariably expreſſed by the ſame ſounds, clearneſs of apprehenſion, extent of knowledge, warmth of conception, elegance of manners, could have no diſtinction of ſtyle or language. The poetic genius

* On the Characteriſtics, Eſſay 3. p. 376. Ed. Lond. 1741.

and

and the ſevere philoſopher, the recluſe and the politician, the modeſt Spartan and the conceited ſophiſt of Athens, the lively French and the Saturnine Engliſh, men of letters and men of buſineſs, muſt have all ſpoken and written exactly in the ſame manner.

LETTERS are alſo the *arbitrary* ſigns of *words*: and different nations ſhape them differently, without copying from one univerſal model. HENCE it is, (according to the reaſoning of this author) that the unpractiſed hand writes with moſt difficulty and leaſt exactneſs; the man of buſineſs with leſs ſcrupulous care, than he who means to diſplay the beauty of his performance; that in epiſtolary correſpondence, with our equals, we are leſs attentive to fair writing; with our ſuperiors, more reſpectfully exact: that the idle monk traced every ſingle character in his miſſal with ſuch nicety, and emblazoned it with ſo much adventitious ornament; while we, of this age, have no leiſure for acquiring ſuch frivolous ſkill, but are contented with writing *legibly*.

But we muſt remind this author (for I am confident he is not to be informed) that this variety of elocution, which he affects to deduce from the difference of languages, prevailed at different periods, among thoſe who ſpoke the very ſame language. It may not be uſeleſs or impertinent, to produce ſome inſtances of this: as they ſhew, how faulty, or imperfect modes of elocution are neceſſarily corrected and improved by experience and judgment: and that reaſon and good ſenſe have always prevailed over faſhion, however generally adopted and eſtabliſhed. Here then let us take a ſhort review of the gradual proceſs of Eloquence among the Athenians and Romans, the only two people who acquired the reputation of it

in

in the antient world. I ſay, the only two people. For however a writer may be pleaſed to diſtinguiſh this mode of ſpeech into various genera and ſpecies, Cicero is much more confined in his diviſion. * He acknowledges no other ſpecies of Grecian Eloquence, but that of Athens. He never heard of a Spartan Orator: ſcarcely of one in any other of the Grecian ſtates. Of Indian Eloquence he is abſolutely ſilent; and as to the Aſiatic, he † explicitly declares, that it was imported from the Piræeus, and adulterated by the manners of the people thro' whom it paſſed.

‡ Ibid. C. 7. The moſt antient ſpeakers of Athens ‡, we are informed, were pompous in their diction, ſententious, conciſe, and ſomewhat obſcure.

Theſe immediate ſucceſſors of the poets copied from their elevation of ſtyle. Their livelineſs and vanity hurried them into general concluſions from their own obſervation and experience: Their quickneſs and conception produced and warranted conciſeneſs; and the obſcurity which aroſe from thence, ſeems to have been increaſed from that boldneſs of figure which they ſtill retained from their ſtate of rudeneſs, and

* Hoc autem ſtuſtium [ſci. *Dicendi*] non erat commune Græciæ, ſed proprium Athenarum. Quis enim aut Argivum Oratorem, aut Corinthium, aut Thebanum ſcit temporibus illis? niſi quid de Epaminonda, docto homine, ſuſpicari libet. Lacedæmonium vero uſque ad hoc tempus audivi fuiſſe neminem. Menelaum ipſum, dulcem illum quidem tradit Homerius, ſed pauca dicentem. Brevitas autem, laus eſt interdum in aliqua parte dicendi, in univerſa eloquentia, laudem non habet. De clar. Orator. C. 13.

† Ut ſemel a Piræeo Eloquentia evecta eſt, omnes peragravit inſulas, atque ita peregrinata tota Aſia eſt, ut ſe externis obliniret moribus, omnemque illam ſalubritatem Atticæ dictionis, quaſi ſanitatem perderet, ac loqui pæne dediſceret. Ibid.

which

which oftentimes gave an ænigmatical appearance to their language and obſervations.*

Theſe antient orators, with a kind of rude untutored violence, applied themſelves to rouſe, to terrify, and inflame, till the gradual refinement of their hearers taught them to guard againſt this dangerous power: and obliged the Orators to reduce their eloquence within ſtricter bounds. Thus it became the next care of this people to give their ſtyle a greater elegance and neatneſs; to prune the luxuriance of the antient diction, to render it more open and explicit, and to range it into ſuch well-adjuſted periods, as might relieve the voice, and come with due force and pleaſure to the ear. And thus plainneſs, neatneſs, elegance and harmony became the diſtinguiſhing characters of Attic Eloquence.

And this we ſhould readily pronounce the moſt perfect mode, if mankind could be always influenced by the mere force of *inſtruction* conveyed with eaſe and grace. But theſe were found too feeble inſtruments for operating on public aſſemblies. And genius, obſervation, and good ſenſe conſpired to produce another neceſſary alteration in the eloquence of Athens, which rendered it more powerful, and more the object of wonder and delight. DEMOSTHENES had the glory of *uniting* the grandeur, pathos, and impetuoſity of the antient ſpeakers, with the clearneſs, elegance, and ſimplicity of their immediate ſucceſſors; ornament with propriety; correctneſs with elevation. He found the happy art of harmonizing the period, without enervating the language, and without the appearance of ſtudied refinement. His animated warmth was

* Thus Steſicorus adviſed the Locrians to reſtrain their inſolence, leſt *their Graſshoppers ſhould chirp upon the ground.* ARIST. RHET. L. 2. C. 21.

juſtly proportioned to the importance of his ſubject; the boldneſs of his figures to the majeſty of his ſentiments. This union of great qualities has ever been regarded as forming the moſt perfect ſpecies of Grecian eloquence. If it be aſſerted, that this is an arbitrary and fantaſtical determination, and that this ſpecies hath no *real* ſuperiority over any of thoſe modes which preceded or ſucceeded it: We muſt appeal to the effects. Can pomp or brevity of ſtyle, can elegance or neatneſs, or harmony of language, can any one or more of theſe qualities prove equally effectual, not only in informing the underſtanding, but in reconciling the affections, and influencing the will? Powerful conviction, elevation of ſentiment, and a flame of generous paſſion, are the greateſt and nobleſt effects produced by any ſpecies of human eloquence: and the Eloquence beſt fitted to produce them, muſt be of the greateſt and nobleſt kind: muſt have a ſuperiority ſomething more than *nominal* or *local*.

When the Romans firſt began to attend to elocution, they might have copied from the very beſt models in Greece. And yet they did not attain to their greateſt perfection, but by a gradual progreſs and improvement, ſimilar to that of Athens.

There prevailed in the days of the elder Cato, what Cicero calls "unctior quædam ac ſplendidior conſuetudo loquendi."* This fullneſs and magnificence of expreſſion was rude and undirected; yet vehement and impetuous.——Aemilius Lepidus had the honour of firſt introducing the—lenitas Græcorum, verborum comprehenſio, & artifex ſtylus †.——Antonius and Craſſus are compared by Cicero to Demoſthenes and Hyperides; yet ſeem, from his ‡ deſcription, to have been more indebted for their fame to art and exerciſe, than to any extraordinary elevation of genius. The ſtyle of the former, tho' not elegant or correct, was forcible and harmonious, his action

* De Claris Orat. C. 20.

† Ibid. C. 25.

‡ C. 37, 38, 39.

action graceful and affecting. And theſe, together with promptneſs and memory, are the qualities to which his influence is principally aſcribed. The abilities of Craſſus were chiefly confined to explaining and inſtructing. Their immediate Succeſſors ſtudied the Attic elegance, and imitated it even to a degree of ridiculous affectation ‖ : 'till Cæſar taught them a more judicious application of this mode to their own language. Hortenſius indeed adopted ſomewhat of the *Aſiatic* manner §. But ATTICISM, or what was ſo deemed, ſtill continued moſt generally faſhionable, 'till the great Maſter aroſe, and gave life and energy to the Roman Eloquence, by ſuch a union of great qualities as obtained the palm in Greece.

‖ C. 74, 75.

§ C. 95.

Thus we find theſe two people gradually advancing by the ſame ſteps, to the ſame point of excellence. At Athens, this was the pure reſult of good ſenſe and obſervation which corrected or improved eſtabliſhed faſhions. At Rome, the effect was partly produced by an imitation of Grecian Models. But theſe models were not imitated meerly becauſe they were Grecian; becauſe they had been admired by others, or had once been faſhionable in thec ountry of Eloquence. Nor were former or preſent faſhions ever regarded as the ſtandard of eloquence. Even in the periods of refinement, the great Roman ſpeakers formed higher ideas of this accompliſhment than had ever been ſuggeſted by their own obſervation. It was the ſaying of Antonius the orator, * *diſertos* ſe vidiſſe multos, *eloquentem* omnino neminem. And Cicero thus addreſſes himſelf to his friend,— † Inveſtigemus hunc igitur, Brute, ſi poſſumus, quem nunquam vidit Antonius, aut qui omnino *nullus nunquam* fuit.

* ORATOR. C. 5.

† Ibid. C. 6.

Theſe Romans, then, ſtudied and admired the ſame general excellencies of ſpeech which had been ſtudied and admired in Greece, but not blindly or implicitly, but with a juſt regard to their own national character, their own occaſions, and the

temper of their hearers. They diſcovered the imperfections both of their co-temporaries and their predeceſſors, whether in Greece or Rome, thro' all the miſts which prejudice or faſhion could oppoſe to their penetration. They were not, then, entirely guided by imitation. As, in general, they purſued the ſame means of influencing their hearers; and as the ſame means are ſtill approved by all poliſhed and lettered Nations, as moſt fit and proper, It follows, that this *fitneſs* and *propriety* cannot be meerly *nominal* and *local*.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIV.

AND now to ſum up all that hath been offered upon this ſubject. A conſiderable part of human ſpeech is addreſſed ſolely or principally to the paſſions and affections. Each of theſe hath it's peculiar mode of expreſſion, in all languages, the ſame in kind, tho' ſometimes differing in the degree of boldneſs and vehemence, according to the different ſtrength or livelineſs of the inward emotion. Theſe different modes are indeed marked by Rhetoricians, and ranged into different claſſes of *Tropes* and *Figures*; but they derive their origin neither from artifice nor refinement. They are in themſelves, the *real*, *natural*, and *neceſſary* reſult of *real* paſſion and emotion, tho', like other ſigns of truth, they may be perverted to the purpoſes of deceit.——The particular qualities of ſpeech, which give it influence and perſuaſion, and which Critics enumerate as the parts of perfect Elocution, are all regulated by the ſame laws, and founded on the ſame principles, in all nations and languages, and have their ſeveral degrees of excellence independent on caprice or faſhion.—— Various

modes

modes of elocution may prevail at different periods, or among different nations; but reaſon, judgment, and experience, as they are gradually enlarged, correct, refine, and improve theſe modes: and, on a general ſurvey of them all, diſtinguiſh ſome, as better adapted to convey ideas clearly, pleaſingly, and forcibly, to impreſs the mind with ſentiments of dignity, to diſplay qualities more engaging or exalted, paſſions more noble and generous: ſo as to reconcile, affect, and influence, more powerfully. Hence it follows, that ELOQUENCE,

1. Is not meerly the abuſe of human Speech.
2. Is not neceſſarily the inſtrument of Fraud.
3. * Is not merely arbitrary, and dependent on faſhion and cuſtom.

The

* There is an obſervation of Dr. Browne in his ingenious Eſſay on Ridicule, which deſerves to be conſidered before this ſubject be diſmiſſed.

" As eloquence," ſaith he, " is of " a vague unſteady nature, merely " relative to the imaginations and paſ- " ſions of mankind, ſo there muſt be " ſeveral orders and degrees of it, ſub- " ordinate to each other in dignity, " yet each perfect in their kind. The " common *end* of each is perſuaſion: " the *means* are different according to " the various capacities, fancies and " affections of thoſe whom the artiſt " attempts to perſuade. The pathetic " orator, who throws a congregation " of enthuſiaſts into tears and groans, " would raiſe affections of a very diffe- " rent nature, ſhould he attempt to " proſelyte an Engliſh Parliament: as " on the other hand, the fineſt ſpeaker " that ever commanded *the Houſe*, " would in vain point the thunder of " his eloquence on a *Quaker-meeting*." [Sect. 3. p. 32.]

This is plauſibly and ingeniouſly urged. But the whole argument is founded on the ſuppoſition, that Eloquence and perſuaſion are one and the ſame, and that to be denominated an orator, no more is neceſſary than to influence and move the hearer. A ſuppoſition which cannot be admitted, however witty men have ſometimes ſpoken of the eloquence of *ſilence*, or the eloquence of *nonſenſe*. " Perſua- " dent enim dicendo," ſaith Quinctilian, " vel ducunt in id quod volunt, " alii quoque, ut meretrices, adula- " tores,

The Principles which I have thus endeavoured to ſupport, in concurrence with the general ſenſe of all the moſt diſtinguiſhed critics, have the additional advantage of ſtanding clear of ſome perplexities in which thoſe of the learned Biſhop of Glouceſter ſeem to be involved, when his Lordſhip comes to apply them to the defence of the Apoſtolical Compoſition.

" tores, corruptores." [L. 2. l. 16.] The alluring accents of an Harlot move the ſenſualiſt; the abject and extravagant praiſes of a flatterer influence the vain man; and the plain promiſe of a large reward, expreſſed without trope or figure, may have the greateſt power over the conduct of a traytor or aſſaſſin. But hence it by no means follows, that the harlot, the flatterer, or the ſuborner is *eloquent*. To merit this praiſe, a man muſt perſuade (if he does perſuade) by the real excellencies, the engaging and conciliating qualities of ſpeech. Accordingly, Ariſtotle tells us, that it is the office of Rhetoric, Οὐ τὸ ΠΕΙΣΑΙ ἀλλὰ τὸ ἰδεῖν τὰ ὑπαρχοντα ΠΙΘΑΝΑ περὶἕκαστον. [Rhet. L. 1. C. 1.] So that the Doctor's orator, who throws a congregation of Enthuſiaſts into tears and groans, is in reality no orator at all: becauſe he owes his influence not to clearneſs and ſtrength of reaſoning, not to dignity of ſentiment, force or elegance of expreſſion, and the like; but to ſenſeleſs exclamation, unmeaning rhapſody, or to grimace, to a ſigh, to a rueful countenance. And if he would in vain endeavour to proſelyte an Engliſh Parliament, it is for this very reaſon, becauſe he is no Orator. On the other hand, it muſt be allowed, that " the fineſt " ſpeaker that ever commanded the " *Houſe*, would in vain point the " Thunder of his eloquence on a " *Quaker-meeting*." Nor could he inform the ideot, nor could his thunder pierce a deaf ear, nor could he affect a foreigner who underſtood not his language. They who hear and underſtand him, who are intereſted in his ſubject, who have ſenſe, knowledge and refinement, if yet their minds be prepoſſeſſed by intereſt or ambition, may liſten unmoved to the ſtrongeſt motives of virtue and public ſpirit, urged with the utmoſt clearneſs and energy. Theſe and ſuch like inſtances amount to no more than this, that a ſpeaker may perſuade without being eloquent, and may be eloquent, without perſuading. Nor can any man who perſuades without any one of Τὰ Πιθανὰ, the *rational* excellencies, and engaging qualities of ſpeech, be ſaid to poſſeſs a degree of Eloquence *perfect in it's kind*. No, not with half the propriety of Goodman VERGES's thankſgiving, " that he is as honeſt as " any man living, that ——— is no " honeſter than himſelf."

Thus,

Thus, for inſtance, while we are obliged to acknowledge that the Old Teſtament abounds in *ornament* of ſtyle, we are not embarraſſed with a poſition which it might require ſome pains to reconcile with ſuch acknowledgment, "that *Ornament* "of Style is the effect of fraud, and the ſubſtitute to ſince-"rity †."

Nor do we pronounce every excellence of ſpeech, *Clearneſs* only excepted, to be *altogether unſuitable to the genius of the* GOSPEL, which yet abounds with *various* excellencies of ſtyle; and is frequently addreſſed not only to the underſtanding, but to the affections and paſſions, in all the conciliating, moving, and enlivening forms of eloqence.

But it is now time to proceed to an important part of his Lordſhip's *diſquiſition, I mean his* CHARACTER *of an* INSPIRED LANGUAGE.

† It muſt be acknowledged, that the learned Biſhop does not always ſtate his poſitions in the ſame manner. For inſtance, when he is to form an argument to prove, that no one mode of Eloquence could have been followed by the ſacred Writers, he aſſerts in general, that all it's various modes are nominal and fantaſtical, p. 52. 58. But when he has once drawn his concluſion, and there is no farther occaſion for the premiſes, then he is pleaſed to ſpeak more cautiouſly. ——"The "various modes of eloquence being "MOSTLY fantaſtical."—Again, he at firſt aſſerts without any limitation, that "the end of Eloquence is to ſtifle reaſon, and inflame the paſſions." p. 56. But when he comes to quote this obſervation, he hath changed it into a quite different propoſition.—— "The *principal* end of Eloquence, *as* "*it is employed in human affairs*, is to "miſlead reaſon, and to cajole the "fancy and affections." p. 66.——— If no notice has been taken of theſe qualifying expreſſions, it is, becauſe his Lordſhip hath omitted them, where he ſtates his argument in due form; and becauſe it ſeemed neceſſary to take his poſitions in that *extent*, which the uſe, and application, and the concluſions deduced from them, evidently require.

CHAP. XV.

CHAP. XV.

THE enemies of our holy faith, as well as ſome imprudent friends, have ſometimes aſſerted, than an inſpired language ſhould be a language of *perfect* eloquence. With regard to this propoſition, his Lordſhip affirms on the contrary, that *rudeneſs* and *barbarouſneſs* form the character of an inſpired language: and that, ſuppoſing the Style of the New Teſtament to abound in every fault that can poſſily deform a language, this is one CERTAIN MARK of it's DIVINE ORIGINAL.——This, as the author ſeems to acknowledge, is a bold aſſertion: and the bolder it appears, the ſtronger and more forcible ſhould be the arguments brought to ſupport it. Theſe I ſhall endeavour to collect fairly and fully.

" Language," ſaith the learned Biſhop, " conſiſts of two " parts, 1. Single terms, which are arbitrary. 2. Phraſes " and Idioms, which ariſe inſenſibly from the manners, cuſ- " toms, and tempers of thoſe to whom the language is verna- " cular. When illiterate men would acquire the knowledge " of a foreign tongue; they make it at firſt their only ſtudy

" to treaſure up in their memory the ſignification of the
" terms: and when they come to talk or write in the ſpeech
" thus acquired, their language is full of their own native
" idioms. If we ſuppoſe this foreign tongue to be inſtanta-
" neouſly infuſed, the effect muſt be the ſame. Divine inſpi-
" ration can only convey the terms and ſingle words of one
" language correſponding to thoſe of another. For, an im-
" preſſion of phraſeology or idiom, requires a previous one of
" the tempers, faſhions and opinions of the people to whom
" the language is native, upon the minds of them to whom
" it is imparted. But this would be a waſte of miracles
" without ſufficient cauſe. For, the terms of one language
" adapted to the idiom of another, abundantly ſerve the pur-
" poſe of giving CLEAR INTELLIGENCE.*"

* Chap. 8. p. 42, 43, 44.

Here, there are ſome things aſſumed as evident and inconteſtible, which yet may be controverted, I preſume, without any breach of candor.—We are told, that in order to convey clear intelligence to a foreigner, nothing more is neceſſary, than to uſe the *words* of his language adapted to the *idiom* of our own.

But ſhall we always find correſpondent words in his language? It is a point well known to philologers and critics, that every language hath not only it's own idiom, but alſo many terms peculiar to itſelf. It is equally well known, and generally acknowledged, that the real purport of almoſt every ſentence in every language, is not to be learned from the ſignification of detached words, and their grammatical congruity, even where their ſignification may be expreſſed by correſponding words in another language. Cicero writes thus to Cato. " Quem ego *currum* aut quam *lauream* cum tua
" *laudatione* conferam ?" Adapt Engliſh words to this Phraſeology,

ſeology, and ſay whether the ſentiment will be conveyed to a meer unlettered Engliſh reader. I open accidentally on the following ſhort epiſtle, which is not encumbered with political or forenſic terms, but written on a plain familiar ſubject.

CICERO. SERVIO. S.

" Hageſaretus Lariſſaeus magnis meis beneficiis ornatus in " conſulatu meo, memor et gratus fuit; meque poſtea dili- " gentiſſime coluit. Eum tibi magnopere commendo, ut et " hoſpitem meum, & familiarem, et gratum hominem, & " virum bonum, & principem civitatis ſuæ, & tua neceſſitu- " dine digniſſimum. Pergratum mihi fèceris, ſi dederis ope- " ram, ut is intelligat hanc meam commendationem apud te " pondus habuiſſe. Vale."

Let any man try to expreſs the ſenſe of theſe few lines in Engliſh words, without deviating from the Roman Idiom.— The figurative phraſe in the concluſion [pondus habuiſſe] may poſſibly have been rendered familiar to an illiterate reader. But I ſuſpect, that one intirely unacquainted with Latin writers, or who never converſed with thoſe that copied from them, muſt find ſome difficulty in comprehending " magnis " meis beneficiis ornatus; meque diligentiſſime coluit," and ſuch like, when tranſlated into——" by my great benefits " *adorned*;" and—" me he moſt diligently *cultivated*." And where are the correſponding Engliſh words, to render " gra- " tum *hominem*," and " *virum* bonum," with ſufficient diſ- tinction? Not to mention " *hoſpitem*, *familiarem*, tua *neceſſi-* " *tudine* digniſſimum, ſi *dederis operam*," and ſuch like terms and phraſes, which it is impoſſible to tranſlate, but according

to the rule prescribed by Cicero.——*Verba* persequens *eatenus*, ut *ea non abhorreant a more nostro*.

* Doctor SWIFT.

* A great genius of the country where I now write, was betrayed by his passion for trifling into the hands of Editors, who have transmitted to the world an idle and unworthy amusement of his private life, that of adapting Latin words to English Phraseology, so as to form a whimsical style, which he called, for some reason not worth remembering, LATINITAS GRATTANIANA. According to his Lordship's position, this species of Latinity would be perfectly intelligible to an old Roman, were he to revisit this world. And yet the design of it was to puzzle and confound those who were acquainted both with the Roman and English languages. Nor is it understood without more attention than it deserves.

† Dialogue 6.

The author of the Minute Philosopher tells us,† that the English Gentleman who informed his foreign guests, that, " Les Chevaux sont tombés ensemble par les Oreilles," made them stare; what expressed *a very plain sense in the original English, being incomprehensible when rendered, word for word, into French.*

The learned SELDEN speaking of a translation of the Bible *word* for *word*, condemns it as an attempt never known. " If," saith he, " I translate a French Book into English, I turn it " into English *Phrase*, not into *French-English*. [*il fait froid*] " I say *'tis cold*, not *it makes cold:* But the Bible is rather " translated into *English words*, than into *English Phrase* ‖." Mr. LEWIS, justly observes upon such a translation, that " it " seems an odd way to convince an Englishman, that *the* " *Scripture is the best interpreter of itself*, to translate it into " such English, AS HE CANNOT UNDERSTAND."§ And to shew

‖ Table-Talk.

§ History of the English Translations of the Bible, p. 352. 8vo. 1739.

ſhew the abſurdity of ſuch an attempt, he quotes the ninety-fifth Pſalm from *Canne*'s literal tranſlation. But, inſtead of recurring to the figurative and poetical parts of ſcripture, let us make the experiment, in a plain hiſtorical narrative.—— The following is a tranſlation from the Hebrew, preciſely in that manner which my Lord Biſhop hath aſſerted to be *abundantly* ſufficient for conveying *clear intelligence* to a perſon acquainted only with the Latin tongue: The *words* being rendered by *correſponding terms*, and the original *phraſeology* ſtrictly preſerved.

2 SAM. 18. 5, &c.

Et præcepit Rex Joabo, Abiſchaio, & Ittaio, dicendo, leniter mihi ipſi puero Abſchalomo. Et omnis populus audivetunt in præcipere Regem omnibus principibus ſuper verbum Abſchalomi; et egreſſus eſt populus in agrum in occurſum Iſraelis; & fuit proelium in ſylva Ephraimi; et cæſi ſunt ibi populus Iſrael, ad facies ſervorum Davidis. Et fuit ibi plaga magna in die illa viginti millium; et fuit proelium ſparſum ſuper facies omnis terræ; et multiplicavit ſylva peredere in populo præ quibus peredit gladius in die illa. Et occurrit Abſchalomus ad facies ſervorum Davidis. Et Abſchalomus equitans ſuper mulum; et intravit mulus ſubter denſitatem quercus magnæ; et invaluit caput ejus in quercu, et datus eſt inter cœlos & inter terram, & mulus qui ſub eo tranſivit. Et vidit vir unus, et indicavit Joabo, & dixit, ecce vidi Abſchalomum ſuſpenſum in quercu. Et dixit Joabus viro indicanti illi, & ecce vidiſtin', & cur non percuſſiſti eum ibi in terram? et, ſuper me dare tibi decem argenteos & cingulum unum. Dixitque vir ad Joabum, et ſi ego appendens ſuper volas meas mille argenteos non mitterem manum meam in filium Regis. Etenim in auribus noſtris præcepit Rex tibi et Abiſchaio, et Ittaio,

Ittaio, dicendo, obſervate quis in puerum ipſum in Abſchalomum ; vel feciſſem in animam meam mendacium, et omne verbum non abſconditum erit a Rege, & tu ſtatueres te ex adverſo. Dixitque Joabus, non ſic expectabo ad facies tuas, et cepit tria ſpicula in vola ſua, it infixit ea in corde Abſchalomi adhuc ipſo vivente in corde quercus : Et circundarunt decem pueri ferentes vaſa Joabi, & percuſſerunt Abſchalomum, & occiderunt eum.

By this time, I preſume, it hath appeared that one part of the argument advanced by the right reverend author, in ſupport of his bold aſſertion, is by no means, univerſally and inconteſtibly evident. And that when he would *demonſtrate the natural condition* of an *inſpired* Language, his firſt and grand principle is ſuch as no critic or grammarian can admit.

And perhaps it is no leſs hazardous to affirm, that " a know-" ledge of the idiom or phraſeology of any language, *always* " implies a previous knowledge of the cuſtoms and manners " of thoſe to whom it is vernacular."——Some phraſes indeed there are in every language, obviouſly deduced from cuſtoms and manners. Yet the general import even of theſe (tho' not always their whole force and beauty) may be acquired without a previous knowledge of theſe cuſtoms or manners. Thus in the inſtance already quoted, " quem ego *currum*, aut quam *lauream* cum tua *laudatione* conferam ? A foreigner might be taught that this ſignifies in general, " what *public honours* " can I put in competition with your *applauſe ?* altho' he had " never heard of a Roman Triumph, &c."——Again, there are other inſtances of Phraſeology abounding in every language, as arbitrary as the detached terms themſelves, at leaſt equally inexplicable from manners or cuſtoms. They may ariſe from accidental aſſociations, from ſimilitudes caſually obſerved,

obſerved, metaphorical or figurative expreſſions formed by accident, approved, adopted, and tranſmitted. But no Philologer attempts the vain labour of tracing them to their origin, or minutely explaining the cauſes which introduced them. He never tells us what there is in the temper or manners of an Engliſhman that leads him to ſay, "it IS cold," inſtead of "it "MAKES cold," or, "let us make an experiment," inſtead of "let us make *a danger*, according to the Latin idiom." And he would find it difficult, I preſume, to explain that difference of manners or cuſtoms of the Hebrews and the Romans, which led them to obſerve different effects of *anger* on the human aſpect, and to form different figurative expreſſions of this paſſion: So that if the Pſalmiſt were to uſe Latin *words*, he would ſay—"Tunc loquetur ad eos in NASO ſuo *;" while the Satyriſt uſes a different phraſeology, on the ſame occaſion;

* Pſal. 2. v. 4.

——————Quin Jupiter ambas
Inflaret BUCCAS. Hor. Sat. 1.

I recollect two ſhort lines from the laſt quoted author, which exemplify the two ſpecies of phraſeology above mentioned.

Cujus octavum *trepidavit* Ætas
Claudere LUSTRUM.

Trepidavit, and, *clauaere*, are inſtances of Roman idiom, not to be explained from manners or cuſtoms, and requiring no previous knowledge of theſe, in order to be underſtood. *Luſtrum*, on the contrary, is a particular elegance of phraſe derived from a particular cuſtom. And yet a foreigner might eaſily comprehend that the word ſignifies a *ſpace of five years*, altho' he is not *previouſly* made acquainted with a long detail of regiſters, taxations, &c.

True it is, that an accurate obſerver of nature may account for the peculiar idiom of a language, in many inſtances, from manners,

manners, &c. even where the expreſſion is not merely technical or political; for the glowing figurative phraſes of the Eaſt, (for inſtance) compared with the more corrected elegance of the Weſt. But how are the manners, characters, and tempers of any people firſt diſcovered? I preſume, from converſing with them; from their language, from their characteriſtical phraſes. A Critic may tell us, whence it is that one nation uſes a bolder and more figurative phraſe, to expreſs a particular action or ſentiment, than another. But firſt he muſt learn, that it is a bolder and more figurative phraſe, and know the action or ſentiment expreſſed by it. Or, in other words, the knowledge of idiom is ſo far from requiring, or implying a previous one of tempers, manners, &c. that the very converſe of this ſeems to be the ſafer principle; and that tempers and manners are not to be learned, without ſome degree of previous acquaintance with the peculiarities of a language.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVI.

INSTEAD, therefore, of accepting that proof of the divine Inſpiration of the Apoſtolical writings, "*the utmoſt* "*rudeneſs and barbarouſneſs of Style, which the moſt exaggerated* "*accounts can repreſent*;" a proof, deduced from principles at leaſt precarious and controvertible, if not abſolutely erroneous; a proof, which theſe writings do not need, and which, if rejected, cannot in the leaſt impair their authority; it ſeems more prudent to confine ourſelves to a propoſition, which, I am confident, admits of the cleareſt evidence; that "all the "rudeneſs of ſtyle which the moſt accurate Critic can diſco-"ver in the writings of the New Teſtament, afford neither "PROOF nor PRESUMPTION, that the authors *were* NOT *di-*"*vinely inſpired.*"

For while I deny that clear intelligence is conveyed to foreigners, by uſing the *terms* of their language, and preſerving the *idiom* of our own, I cannot think it neceſſary to accept of the alternative offered by the learned Biſhop, [p. 44.] and to

admit, as a neceſſary conſequence, that, in order to be clearly underſtood in any language, our knowledge of it muſt extend to ALL it's peculiarities or elegancies. This is indeed an *ignorant fancy*, and *repugnant to reaſon and experience*. The vulgar in every nation converſe intelligibly with their countrymen, without knowing or conforming to the elegancies of their own language. The perſon of greateſt refinement, who addreſſes himſelf to this order of men, muſt accommodate his language to his hearers; in order to be underſtood, in order to make an impreſſion upon their minds, his ſpeech, far from being polite and elegant, muſt be ſtrictly plain, and ſometimes even rude and coarſe. An Engliſhman who can ſpeak the French tongue with tolerable eaſe and fluency, tho' not with accurate purity, not without *ſome* mixture of his native idiom, may yet inform a Pariſian of matters of fact; may inſtruct him in ſome important rule of conduct; may give clear and ſatisfactory evidence in his courts of juſtice. And unhappy it would be for mankind, indeed, if no intelligence could be clearly conveyed, but by the ſtricteſt accuracy and niceſt elegance of language.

Let us then proceed to the caſe of a foreign language inſtantaneouſly communicated by divine power. The GIFT of TONGUES, in it's nature, manner, and extent, muſt have been ſuch as is WORTHY of God. Granted! But in this *worthineſs* nothing more can be implied, than that it muſt be *abundantly ſufficient* for the purpoſes of his wiſdom and goodneſs.

One purpoſe was, to manifeſt the divine agency by this miracle.——And ſurely, a Rhetorician who had been witneſs of this effuſion of the Holy Spirit upon the Apoſtles, muſt have juſtly expoſed himſelf to the ridicule of all ſenſible men, had he attempted

attempted to efface the impreſſion of this ſtupendous event, by obſerving that, altho' theſe men were in a moment enabled to ſpeak intelligibly in ſtrange languages, yet they did not ſpeak them exactly with the ſame elegance and correctneſs as the moſt admired orators or writers in each language, nor without ſuch a mixture of their own idiom as diſtinguiſhed them from thoſe to whom the languages were vernacular.

Another purpoſe was, to convey truths of the utmoſt, general importance to mankind, either by no means diſcoverable to human reaſon, or imperfectly and difficultly diſcoverable by the moſt improved reaſons.——And to convey them, not in ſuch a manner as to prevent all poſſibility of the leaſt ignorance or miſtake even in the moſt inattentive hearer; to ſubdue the moſt inveterate perverſeneſs, or obſtinate ſupineneſs, but ſo as to ſatisfy the ingenuous and diligent enquirer: and, in ſome caſes, to afford an opportunity for the diſplay of candor and humility.

It is not NECESSARY, that the language, in which *ſuch* truths are *thus* conveyed, ſhould be abſolutely clear of any foreign mixture, even tho' ſome degree of obſcurity or difficulty ſhould ariſe merely from ſuch mixture. Becauſe, it was intended that an occaſion ſhould be left for inquiry and examination, and a diligent exerciſe of the mental powers; and attention and ingenuouſneſs are encouraged by the promiſe of acceptance and reward.

It is not POSSIBLE, that the language in which *ſuch* truths are *thus* conveyed, ſhould be exactly conformable to any approved model of human compoſition. Becauſe, it is to expreſs ſentiments and ideas which never were conceived by the Orator or Philoſopher, and for which, of conſequence, they afford no terms or forms of ſpeech.

It is not PROPER, that the language in which *ſuch* truths are *thus* conveyed ſhould be exquiſitely *refined* and *elegant*. Becauſe, it is addreſſed to the ignorant and vulgar, to whom refinement oftentimes creates unneceſſary obſcurity; as well as to the wiſe and exalted, to whom a plain and even rude Style may be as *intelligible*, as the utmoſt elegance of Schools or Courts.

So that if we are preciſely to aſcertain the *natural* character or condition of an *inſpired* language, we may perhaps with greateſt ſafety define it in the words of ORIGEN *: Χαρακτὴρ ΚΟΙΝΩΦΕΛΗΣ, καὶ δυναμένῳ. ΠΑΣΑΝ ἐπαγαγέσθαι ἀκοήν. Such a Style as may be of moſt extenſive uſe, and univerſally adapted to all hearers of all conditions. Thus, while we exclude on one hand *the utmoſt rudeneſs* and *barbarouſneſs*, *every fault that can poſſibly deform a language*, that is, ſuch a mode of ſpeech as is inſufficient for *clear intelligence*; while we do not pretend to determine what qualities of ſpeech the divine impreſſion can or cannot convey, without a waſte of miracles. So, on the other hand, we are warranted to affirm, that this ΚΟΙΝΩΦΕΛΕΙΑ, this quality which indicates the moſt extenſive benevolence in the divine INSPIRER, is not to be found in the poliſhed ſtyle of the elaborate writer or elegant Philoſopher, who can be of uſe, if they are at all of uſe, only to their *few literate* admirers: as the author above-quoted obſerves *.

We are not, then, to look for exquiſite purity and elegance in the Apoſtolical writings, even ſuppoſing that the authors

* Contra Celſum. L. 6. Init.

* Ο'ΛΙΓΟΥΣ μὲν ὤνησεν (εἶνε ὤνησεν) ἡ περικαλλὴς καὶ ἐπιτηδευμένη ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ, καὶ τῶν παραπλησίως φρασάντων, ΛΕΞΙΣ. Πλείονας δέ ἡ τῶν εὐξηλέσλερον ἅμα καὶ πραγμαλικῶς καὶ ἐσλοχασμένως, τῶν πολλῶν διδαξάνλων καὶ γραψάνλων. Ἐσλι γοῦν ἰδεῖν τὸν μέν Πλάλωνα ἐν χερσὶ τῶν δοκούνλων εἶναι φιλολόγων μόνον. Ibid.

acquired

acquired their language by miraculous infuſion. And theſe are qualities of ſpeech which even in the little affairs of human life and human knowledge, are accounted but of an inferior value; are ſacrificed to the higher and more eſſential excellencies of ſtyle; are in many inſtances inſufficient for operating upon the human mind: and ſometimes become contemptible and ridiculous, if too ſcrupulouſly and minutely regarded.—

* When Brutus had harangued the Romans in the Capitol, after the death of Cæſar, he ſent a copy of his ſpeech to Cicero, with a requeſt that he would offer his corrections freely. The orator found that, inſtead of breathing that freedom, that ardor, that vehemence of ſpirit which the great occaſion required, it was nice, elaborate, and elegant. He therefore declined the vain attempt of amending it, becauſe it was *altogether* wrong, (as he plainly, tho' civilly, inſinuates to Atticus) becauſe the general Character of it was injudicious, the whole colouring improper for the Speaker, the Subject, and the Audience.

* Vid. Epiſt. ad Atticum. L. 15. E. 1.

And let thoſe men who are ſo little affected by the *truths* contained in the Apoſtolical writings, as to have leiſure to examine the niceties of compoſition, and to be offended at their ſuppoſed defects in elegance and claſſical refinement; let them, I ſay, remember that in every work of *human* genius, the judicious Critic never fails to diſtinguiſh between the merit of diction, and that of the ſubject-matter or information which it contains. Trifles and abſurdities he rejects with ſcorn, tho' tricked out in all the gaiety of language. Solid ſenſe and uſeful knowledge command his atttention. He diſcovers them, tho' diſgraced, or even diſguiſed, by rude language: and would look down with pity and contempt on that BEMBO who ſhould reject them, becauſe not expreſſed agreeably to his

his finical and pedantic notions of refinement. If NEWTON had written his invaluable *Principia*, not in his own neat Latinity, but in a Style ſomewhat incorrect and corrupted, yet ſtill ſufficiently intelligible; what ſhould we think of that man who, tho' capable of following the divine Philoſopher through all his ſtupendous diſcoveries, ſhould yet ſit down in wilful ignorance, leſt his ear ſhould be ſhocked with phraſes not exactly *Ciceronian?*——But in the caſe of truths intimately connected with our immediate intereſt or happineſs, a faſtidious attention to the manner in which they are conveyed, becomes infinitely more unreaſonable and extravagant. If we were aſſured upon the fulleſt evidence, that a man could teach us a ſpeedy and infallible method of becoming rich, or powerful, or great; ſhould we weigh his phraſes, and meaſure his periods? ſhould we not receive his directions with attention and reſpect; far from cavilling at his expreſſions? ſhould we not ſtretch all our faculties to comprehend them, were they even delivered with an oracular obſcurity, far from murmuring, or rejecting them, becauſe, in ſome leſs important inſtances it might not be, at once, eaſy to comprehend their full force and import? Or, to borrow another alluſion no leſs appoſite to the point before us; ſhould the wretch, long waſted, afflicted, and tormented with ſickneſs, reject the charitable aſſiſtance of his phyſician, becauſe his directions were inelegantly expreſſed, or not in a manner conſonant to his notions of critical perfection; ſhould he find leiſure to entertain a doubt of his well-approved ſkill, for this reaſon; could we believe him in his ſound mind? could we acquit him of infatuation and abſurdity?——And can it be deemed reaſonable

and

and judicious to indulge ſuch fantaſtical ſcruples, when we are viſited by the PHYSICIAN of SOULS?

And what adds to the unreaſonableneſs of theſe *delicate* readers, and what ſome of them may perhaps account ſtill more ſhameful, is, that their objections are oftentimes *ignorantly* and *erroneouſly* alledged. However * an eminent Philoſopher may have ſpoken of the Apoſtolical compoſition in ſtrong and general terms, ~~and~~ as made up of Greek terms and Hebrew or Syriac idioms; yet it has been † proved, that ſuch expreſſions are not to be underſtood without great limitation: as many of thoſe inſtances of phraſeology which are noted as Hebraiſms or Syriaſms, are found to be not all peculiar to theſe languages, but warranted by the authority of the moſt approved Greek writers:——that, in other inſtances, even where the ſubject-matter doth not make it *neceſſary* to recur to Hebrew phraſeology, the mode of expreſſion is beautiful, forcible, and univerſally intelligible:——that, as to the charge of impurity or barbarouſneſs of particular terms, XENOPHON himſelf, when writing of the affairs and cuſtoms of Perſia, adopts the terms of that country, uncenſured by the ſevereſt critic: that the like liberty is equally juſtifiable in ſpeaking of Roman cuſtoms and tranſactions; that Κῆνσος, Κουστοδία, Κεντουρίων, are no more barbarous than Κανδὸς, Ἀχικάνης, Παρασάγγης:——That, Cicero (that model of elocution by which ſome men would try the merit of the ſacred writings) found it neceſſary to invent words and phraſes in order to explain the Greek philoſophy to his countrymen:——And that, as to thoſe forms of expreſſion in the New Teſtament, which men of affected accuracy have condemned as

* Mr. LOCK. *Vid.* Preface to the Paraphraſe on St. Paul's Epiſtles.

† *Vid.* BLACKWALL's Sacred Claſſics.

rude

rude Soleciſms, they are in numberleſs inſtances exactly parallelled in the Claſſical Writers of Greece; they are juſtified by the rules of liberal Criticiſm; and however they may offend the cold pedantic grammarian, they are no other than thoſe free figurative modes of ſpeech which naturally occur to the animated writer; and, in human compoſition, are oftentimes regarded as proofs of ſuperior genius.

Nor can I venture to pronounce ſo ſevere a ſentence on thoſe writers who have endeavoured to defend the purity of Scripture-Greek, as that their labours have been idly employed, or that they are *falſe zealots*, who have ſhewed themſelves *fooliſh*. For although we may not think it neceſſary to join iſſue with our adverſaries, upon this point of purity: yet the learned reſearches of thoſe who eſteem it a point of moment, are not without their advantages. They detect the preſumption of affected Critics and commentators: They ſhew that ſuch men have objected raſhly and unwarrantably; have dared to fix their mark of reprobation upon phraſes and expreſſions, ſupported by the moſt indiſputable authorities. So far therefore, they contribute to put to ſilence the *ignorance* of fooliſh men. And if there be thoſe, who concur in ſuch precipitate cenſures, in order to render the authority of the divine writings ſuſpected, while we endeavour to ſupport their authority againſt the whole force of ſuch cenſures, even upon the ſuppoſition that they are fairly founded, it muſt reflect double ſhame upon ſuch adverſaries, if it be proved in any inſtances that their objection is groundleſs; and that * *they betray as ſmall a guſt of the elegancies of expreſſion, as of the ſacredneſs of the matter,* in theſe divine writings.

* Doctor South.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVII.

CRITICS inform us, that, in order to determine of what kind the Compoſition of any work ſhould be, we are to conſider the author and his character, the ſubject, occaſion, and deſign, and the perſons to whom his work is addreſſed. Such are the rules preſcribed by * QUINCTILIAN, for writing with propriety; and by ſuch we may ſafely try the writings of the Evangeliſts and Apoſtles.

* Inſt. L. II. C. I.

Claſſical elegance and politeneſs of Style, we have ſeen, are utterly inconſiſtent with their ſubject, and their purpoſe, unſuited to their readers, and we muſt add (what is too evident to require a proof) to their own characters and conditions. It is alſo evident, that any ſtudied Rhetorical ornament, any falſe or artificial eloquence, muſt have utterly diſgraced both the authors and their cauſe; as theſe are indeed the *ſuccedaneum to conſcious perſuaſion*, the marks of fraud or affectation, and the effects of an attention to matters of much leſs moment than the general happineſs of mankind.

Plainneſs and ingenuous ſimplicity, that language of noble ſentiments and unſpotted integrity, we may juſtly expect to form the general character of their elocution. We may reaſonably look for elevation and greatneſs in the expoſition of their ſublime doctrines; warmth, tenderneſs, and earneſtneſs in their exhortations, and all thoſe qualities of *native genuine* Eloquence which are reverenced and admired, not becauſe adopted by any admired writers or ſpeakers, but becauſe they are in themſelves venerable, as the indications of exalted manners, and clear and noble conceptions; thoſe qualities, I ſay, which captivate the heart, and delight the true genius who ſoars above the minutiæ of words and particles: that *real* and *ſubſtantial* Eloquence which no particularities of diction can impair, which does not depend on a nice conformity to the rules of any language, but can abide the ſevere teſt of LONGINUS, and muſt approve itſelf to all nations, tongues, and ages.

Men of the moſt exquiſite taſte in literature have given honourable teſtimony to that SIMPLICITY, by which the Hiſtorical parts of the New Teſtament are diſtinguiſhed. And indeed there is nothing ſo pleaſing to the human mind, as to contemplate great and glorious objects thro' the medium of a Style unſullied by any falſe and artificial colouring. But in this ſimplicity there is, at the ſame time, ſomething ſo lively and affecting, ſo delightful to the imagination, ſo conciliating and endearing, as, I am bold to ſay, cannot be equalled in the whole circle of human compoſition. Attempts have been ſometimes made to imitate it. But theſe only ſhew the feeble and ineffectual efforts of human genius, aſpiring to an unaffected native dignity of compoſition truely *inimitable*. The Abbé de SAINT REAL was a writer of taſte and elegance; his

language

language is a language of elegance; he lived in an age of refinement; he was eminent as a poliſhed hiſtorian; and, in his Life of CHRIST, he hath ſtrictly attended to the natural and ſimple manner of the Evangeliſts. But how utterly cold and languid, and even mean doth his narrative appear to one converſant in the Goſpels? I ſhall detain the reader but with a ſingle inſtance, and this, not the moſt ſtriking in his work. And it is exhibited, under the ſame diſadvantage with the original, that of a literal tranſlation.——The polite Frenchman relates the miraculous appearance of Angels to the Shepherds, in the following manner.

" Shepherds who paſſed the night by their flocks in the ad-
" jacent fields, ſaw, at the ſame time, an angel, who affrighted
" them at firſt, by a light intirely unuſual, with which he
" ſurrounded them. But he immediately quieted their fears,
" by informing them of the news which was the occaſion of
" this prodigy. He even told them by what marks they
" might know the Saviour that was born to them. And, at
" that inſtant they heard in the air a concert of many voices
" like that of the angel, celebrating the glory of God in the
" heavens, and the Peace which he had now given to men
" upon earth." *

The ſame particulars are thus related by the Evangeliſt.

* Des Bergers qui paſſoient la nuit auprès de leurs Troupeaux dans les Champs d'alentour, virent en même tems un Ange qui les affraya d'abord par une Lumiere tout extraordinaire dont il les environna; mais il les raſſura incontinent, en leur apprenant la Novelle qui étoit l'occaſion de ce prodige. Il leur dit même à quelles marques ils pourroient reconnoitre le Sauveur qui leur étoit né, & ils entendirent auſſi-tôt, dans les airs un concert de pluſieurs Voix comme de l'Ange, qui celébroient la gloire de Dieu dans les Cieux, et la Paix qu'il venoit de donner aux hommes ſur la Terre. *La Vie de Jeſus-Chriſt, p.* 28. *Tom.* 1. *Edit. Paris,* 1757.

" And there were, in the ſame country, ſhepherds abiding " in the fields, keeping watch over their flock by night. " And *lo!* the Angel *of the Lord* came upon them; and the " Glory of the Lord ſhone round about them, and they were " *ſore afraid.* And the Angel ſaid to them, Fear not, for " behold, I bring you good tidings of great joy, which ſhall " be to all people. For to you is born this day, in the city of " David, a Saviour, which is Chriſt the Lord. And this " ſhall be a ſign to you, ye ſhall find the Babe wrapped in " ſwaddling-cloaths, lying in a manger. And ſuddenly there " was with the Angel a multitude of the heavenly hoſt, " praiſing God, and ſaying, Glory be to God in the higheſt, " and on earth peace, good will towards men." St. Luke ii. 8, &c.

Here, the whole ſolemn ſcene is in a manner preſented to our view, by the livelineſs and natural grandeur of the deſcription. We ſee the terror of the ſhepherds in the very words which deſcribe the approach of the Angel [*he came upon them*, ἐπέστη αὐτοῖς.] And the effect of this appearance is expreſſed in the original, by one of thoſe inſtances of phraſeology, common both to Greeks and Hebrews, but too bold and forcible for the weakneſs of modern language to ſupport. [ἐφοβήθησαν φόβον μεγαν]—We are almoſt witneſſes of the awe and reverence with which the divine meſſage is received. And then, the ſudden appearance of the heavenly choir compleats the grandeur of the ſcene, a circumſtance omitted by the French writer, who only takes notice that their voices were heard in the air.

One might proceed in multiplying inſtances of lively and beautiful narration in the ſacred writers. But the Eloquence which is addreſſed to the taſte and refinement of the Critic, is

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ſtill of an inferior kind. There is another more valuable and exalted ſpecies, as hath been already obſerved, which is admired, as it indicates exalted moral qualities in the ſpeaker, and from hence derives it's influence. This it is which determines the ſuperiority of any one among the renowned ſpeakers and writers of antiquity, not the delicate choice of phraſes, lively images, or flowing periods. FENELON pronounces ſentence in favour of DEMOSTHENES againſt the pretenſions of the great Roman. And why? Not from the greater excellence of his language; not from the ſuperior accuracy of his ſtyle, the brilliancy or propriety of his figures, or ſuch like inferior qualifications: but becauſe he hath an enthuſiaſm of generous paſſion which warms the heart of a reader even at this diſtant period: becauſe he diſplays an exalted regard to his country; a noble indignation againſt treachery and corruption; from which we catch the flame at once, and are ready to take arms againſt an imaginary tyrant and invader; while, in ſtudying the Eloquence of CICERO, we are only delighted and ſurprized with his conſummate addreſs. In the like manner the hiſtorical writer will be ſtudied with the greateſt pleaſure, and moſt extenſive approbation, who diſplays the moſt excellent moral qualities of an Hiſtorian in the moſt ſtriking and pleaſing light. In this ſenſe, a writer divinely directed or inſpired muſt indeed be a model of perfect Eloquence.——And ſuch is that ſtrength of character in which this ſpecies of perfection is expreſſed by all the Evangeliſts, that he who runs may read it. The events which they relate, were of all others moſt ſuſceptible of ornament and amplification. And had they written to one refined and volatile people, had they been to recite their hiſtory at the national aſ-

ſembly

ſembly of ſuch a people, and looked for the honour paid to an elegant literary entertaiment, it is poſſible we might find the ſtupendous actions they recorded, ſet out in all the glittering decorations that art and genius could ſupply. The birth, the life, the actions, the diſcourſes of their maſter might then have been diſplayed and ornamented to the utmoſt. The circumſtances of every miracle, the impreſſions made on thoſe who were the objects, or the witneſſes of it, the virulence of their enemies, the unwearied goodneſs of our Lord, his patience and humility, the tortures he endured, his expiring agonies, the aweful darkneſs which overſpread the whole world at his diſſolution, and innumerable grand and affecting particulars, might have all afforded occaſions for the moſt refined, moſt auguſt, and moſt pathetic deſcriptions. But the Evangeliſts ſtood before the great Tribunal of Mankind to give EVIDENCE of facts which concerned the happineſs of the whole world. Here was no place for the refined and neat language of a philoſopher; or the free excurſions, the artful exaggerations, the enflamed elocution of a political Orator. Theſe would be diſguſtful and ſuſpicious. Far from ſuch injudicious and hiſhoneſt affectation, they give their Evidence with the moſt ingenuous plainneſs, with the utmoſt clearneſs and preciſion, qualities, which Critics account the perfection of ſpeech on ſuch an occaſion, and which the ſound reaſoner muſt regard as ſtrong internal proof of truth and ſincerity. To theſe we may add, (what judicious readers have frequently noted with wonder and ſatisfaction) the openneſs and impartiality, with which theſe ſacred hiſtorians have recorded the errors and infirmities of themſelves, or their companions; the abaſement and humility with which they ſpeak of their own wonderful powers; the meekneſs they expreſs in relating the

tranſactions

tranſactions of thoſe who perſecuted, condemned, or betrayed their maſter, without rancour, bitterneſs or exaggeration.* The candid enquirer who looks for the proper fruits of divine inſpirations in the Evangelical ſtyle, may find them in ſuch inſtances as theſe; for theſe are the FRUITS of the SPIRIT.

Or if the imagination muſt be impreſſed with ſomething aweful, majeſtic, and affecting, not only in the ſubject, but the manner of narration, we need but recur to any one account of any one miracle of our Saviour. We are told that he *rebuked* the winds, and they were ſtill; that he laid his hands on the ſick, and they were reſtored; that he commanded the Paralytic to take up his bed, and he obeyed; that he pronounced the word, † *be opened*, and the blind was reſtored to

* The obſervation of Monſieur PASCAL is lively and judicious.—— Le Style de l'Evangile eſt admirable en une infinité de manieres, et entre autres en ce qu'il n'y a aucune invective de la part des Hiſtoriens contre Judas ou Pilate, ni contre aucun des ennemis ou des bourreaux de JESUS CHRIST.——Si cette modeſtie des hiſtoriens évangéliques avoit été affectée, auſſi-bien que tant d'autres traits d'u ſi beau caractere, et qu'il ne l'euſſent affectée que pour la faire remarquer; s'ils n'avoient oſé la remarquer eux-mêmes, ils n'auroint pas manqué de ſe procurer des amis, qui euſſent fait ces remarques à leur avantage. Mais comme ils ont agi de la ſorte ſans affectation, & par un mouvement tout déſintéreſſé, ils ne l'ont fait remarquer par perſonne: je ne ſai même, ſi cela a été remarqué juſques ici: et c'eſt ce qui témoigne la naïveté avec laquelle la choſe a été faité.

[Penſées. C. 16.

† There is ſomething aweful in the particular relation of the very Syriac words, which CHRIST pronounced on ſome of thoſe occaſions. Without ſearching for the propriety of it, in the particular cuſtoms of his nation, it ſeems to command all the attention of the Reader, and to prepare him for ſomething wonderful and extraordinary. If indeed we ſuppoſe that the abſurd notion of the magical power of ſounds had prevailed ſo early as the time of the Apoſtles, and that even then it had been ſuggeſted, that our Lord had performed his miracles, by means of one or more magical words; in that caſe, the particularity here mentioned, muſt appear highly proper, and diſcovers a moſt amiable condeſcenſion to the ignorance and ſuperſtition of gainſayers.

ſight,

ſight, that he ſaid, *Maiden ariſe*, and the dead aroſe to life.—If we are to be tranſported with exalted doctrines and ſentiments of excellence and dignity, we need but turn to his precepts; if we are delighted with eaſe and familiarity, lively images and appoſite alluſions, we find them in his parables and illuſtrations; if we admire addreſs and delicacy, pathos and energy, we are amply gratified by the ſpeeches of Saint PAUL; his diſcourſe on the Reſurrection, and indeed by numberleſs paſſages in the Epiſtolary part of the New Teſtament. I might here proceed to conſider this part more particularly, to account for the obſcurity ſometimes objected to it, to point out the inſtances of energy, zeal, benevolence, nobleneſs of ſentiment, tenderneſs, ſeverity, dignity, condeſcenſion, and all the other parts of great and exalted eloquence, with which it abounds. But all theſe points have been frequently and fully treated by writers of great authority.

I ſhall therefore content myſelf with obſerving, that as the Scriptures afford an inconteſtible proof that there is a ſpecies of Eloquence independent on caprice or faſhion, not barely nominal, not directed to the purpoſe of deceit; that there is a real diſtinction between this natural and genuine Eloquence, the effect of exalted and enlightened thoughts, noble paſſions, and generous principles; and the rhetorical ornaments of ſtyle, the reſult of artifice and imitation:—So the Apoſtle PAUL is an illuſtrious inſtance to prove the ſuperior force and efficacy of the former ſpecies. He diſclaimed the enticing words of man's Wiſdom, the refinements of pretended Philoſophers, and the arts of the Orator: nor was the rudeneſs of his ſpeech, nor the weakneſs of his bodily preſence fitted for the Academy, the Forum, or the Court. And yet the LYSTRIANS would have ſacrificed to him, as to the God of Eloquence: And his ſpeech had

had the power to throw the Roman Governor into an agony of terror.

CICERO is ſaid to have wrought a like effect on CÆSAR; and by artfully mentioning the Battle of Pharſalia, and the danger he there encountered, to have made him turn pale and tremble. But in this I can diſcover nothing extraordinary, no more than I can perceive any thing derogatory to the good ſenſe of CÆSAR, in ſuppoſing that his emotion was real and unaffected. The Battle of Pharſalia was an object which he could not recollect with indifference, were he actuated with any degree of ſenſibility or paſſion. The bare remembrance of his enterprize, his danger, or his ſucceſs, was ſufficient to raiſe the moſt violent agitations in a mind like his. When any of thoſe intereſting objects had been ſuddenly preſented to his imagination, no wonder if the impreſſion was too quick and violent to be diſſembled. The combuſtible lay ready prepared; and a ſmall ſpark of eloquence was ſufficient to raiſe the flame.

But the Apoſtle had every difficulty to contend with, every circumſtance that might prevent the effect of his diſcourſe. He ſtood before a Tribunal, where he was accuſed of hainous offences, ſurrounded by his perſecutors; he ſtood before a judge rendered obdurate and inſenſible by his corruptions. He was cruel and libidinous, and, as Tacitus informs us, "jus regium SERVILI INGENIO exercuit.*" And the power with which he was inveſted, joined with this ſervility and brutality of temper, was a circumſtance, which, of all others, muſt have rendered him moſt averſe from the ſacred truths urged by the Apoſtle, and made his noble freedom appear in the higheſt degree inſolent and provoking. Or if the hopes of a bribe ſoftened the reſentment of Felix, the aſſociate

* Hiſtoriar. L. 5.

of his crime attended him; and her preſence, and poſſibly that of the miniſters of his pleaſures and corruptions, we may reaſonably conclude, muſt have inſpired him with a vitious ſhame; ſo as to make him affect an indifference and unconcern at what he heard: and theſe his attendants no doubt were not backward in caſting ridicule and contempt on the deſpiſed priſoner. Yet, thro' all theſe obſtacles, the Eloquence of the Spirit pierced the heart of this ſordid, ſtupid, ſenſual, proud, and cruel Governor.

The ſpeech of the Apoſtle might not have been ſo pure, ſo poliſhed, ſo elegant, as the Rhetoric of TERTULLUS, but it had powers and excellencies, compared with which, purity, politeneſs, and elegance are leſs than Nothing. It diſplayed that character which God hath plainly impreſſed upon the Word, whether preached or written by his inſpired teachers. ——IT IS LIVELY AND MIGHTY IN OPERATION, AND SHARPER THAN ANY TWO-EDGED SWORD, AND ENTERETH THOROUGH, EVEN UNTO THE DIVIDING ASUNDER OF THE SOUL AND SPIRIT, AND OF THE JOINTS, AND THE MARROW, AND IS A DISCERNER OF THE THOUGHTS AND INTENTS OF THE HEART. HEB. iv. 21.

He who cannot feel this wonderful power in the Apoſtolical writings, is fit for the piddling employment of culling Rhetorical flowers, weighing words, and rounding periods. He may call this literature; but while the pious Chriſtian pities his folly, the Critic of true taſte and ſenſibility muſt deſpiſe his mean notions of PERFECT ELOQUENCE.

The E N D.